AIRCRAFT SERIOUS INCIDENT

PRELIMINARY REPORT

SI 11/25

Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB)

Ministry of Transport Malaysia

Fixed-Wing Aircraft Boeing 737-800,

Registration 9M-MXU, at Sultan Ahmad Shah Airport, Kuantan, Pahang

on 27 November 2025

Air Accident Investigation Bureau
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AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BUREAU (AAIB) MALAYSIA

PRELIMINARY REPORT NO: SI 11/25

OPERATOR	**: MALAYSIA AIRLINES BERHAD**
AIRCRAFT TYPE	**: BOEING 737-800**
NATIONALITY	**: MALAYSIA**
REGISTRATION	**: 9M-MXU**
PLACE OF OCCURRENCE	**: SULTAN AHMAD SHAH AIRPORT, KUANTAN, PAHANG**
DATE AND TIME	**: 27 NOVEMBER 2025 AT 1948 LT (1148 UTC)**

This preliminary report contains statement of facts which have been determined up to the time of issue only. It must be regarded as tentative, and is subject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available.

This investigation is carried out to determine the circumstances and causes of the accident with a view to the preservation of life and the avoidance of accident or incident in the future. It is not the purpose of this investigation to apportion blame or liability (Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention and Civil Aviation Regulations 2016).

All times in this report are Local Time (LT) unless stated otherwise. LT is UTC +8 hours.

INTRODUCTION

The Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) is the air accident investigation authority in Malaysia and is responsible to the Minister of Transport. Its mission is to promote aviation safety through the conduct of independent and objective investigations into air accidents and serious incidents.

The AAIB also conducts investigation into incidents when the occurrence shows evidence to have safety concerns.

The AAIB conducts investigations in accordance with the Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention and Civil Aviation Regulations of Malaysia 2016. The AAIB adheres to the International Civil Aviation Organisation's (ICAO's) stated objective, which is as follows:

"The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the prevention of accident and incident. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability".

Accordingly, it is inappropriate that AAIB reports should be used to assign fault or blame or determine liability, since neither the investigation nor the reporting process has been undertaken for that purpose.

In accordance with ICAO Annex 13 paragraph 4.1, notification of this serious incident was sent out on 29 November 2025 to the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM) and National Transport Safety Board (NTSB), United States of America as the State of Design and Manufacture.

Unless otherwise indicated, recommendations in this report are addressed to the investigating or regulatory authorities of the State having responsibility for the matters with which the recommendations are concerned. It is for those authorities to decide what action is to be taken.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A	
AAIB	Air Accident Investigation Bureau
AMM	Aircraft Maintenance Manual
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATPL	Air Transport Pilot Licence
C	
CAAM	Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia
CoA	Certificate of Airworthiness
CoR	Certificate of Registration
CPL	Commercial Pilot Licence
CVR	Cockpit Voice Recorder
F	
FDR	Flight Data Recorder
ft	feet
H	
hPa	Hectopascal
hrs	Hours
I	
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
IFR	Instruments Flight Rules
ILS	Instrument Landing System
IMC	Instrument Meteorological Conditions
K	
Kts	Knots
L	
LDA	Landing Distance Available
LT	Local Time

M

MAB	Malaysia Airlines Berhad
MAG	Malaysia Aviation Group
MAHB	Malaysia Airports Holdings Berhad
METAR	Meteorological Aerodrome Report
Mhz	Megahertz
MOR	Mandatory Occurrence Report

N

NOTAM	Notice to Airman
NTSB	National Transport Safety Board

P

PAPI	Precision Approach Path Indicator
PF	Pilot Flying
PIC	Pilot-in-Command
PM	Pilot Monitoring
POB	persons on board

R

RA	Radio Altimeter
RMAF	Royal Malaysian Air Force

S

SIC	Second-in-Command
STOL	Short Take-off and Landing

U

UTC	Coordinated Universal Time

V

VFR	Visual Flight Rules

W

WMKD	Sultan Ahmad Shah Airport, Kuantan
WMKK	Kuala Lumpur International Airport

SYNOPSIS

On 27 November 2025, Malaysia Airlines flight MH1276, a Boeing 737-800 (9M-MXU), experienced a runway excursion during landing at Sultan Ahmad Shah Airport (WMKD) following a scheduled flight from Kuala Lumpur International Airport (WMKK). Despite widespread rain and Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), the flight proceeded normally until the final approach to Runway 36. During an ILS approach to Runway 36, the aircraft was stabilised by 1,000 ft, with the Pilot-in-Command (PIC) correcting minor deviations noted by the Second-in-Command (SIC). Due to an unserviceable Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI), the PIC used runway edge lights and visual cues to continue the approach. Below 50 ft Radio Altimeter (RA), the aircraft drifted right during the flare. Despite corrective inputs, the aircraft touched down right of the centreline and the right main landing gear veered off the paved runway surface onto the adjacent grass area before the aircraft was steered back onto the runway.

The flight crew reported that they were initially unaware of the excursion and taxied the aircraft safely to the apron where subsequent inspections revealed significant evidence of the event. Ground crews discovered deep cuts on the starboard tyres and traces of grass in the wheel well and also inboard flap area, while a runway inspection confirmed damage to three runway edge lights and tyre marks on the grass strip. Following the incident, the operator notified the Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) and submitted a Mandatory Occurrence Report to the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM). An official investigation was consequently initiated.

1.0 FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of the Flight

On 27 November 2025, a Boeing 737-800 aircraft, registered 9M-MXU operated by Malaysia Airlines Berhad, was conducting a scheduled commercial passenger flight, MH1276 from WMKK to WMKD, Kuantan, Malaysia. The flight was normally scheduled to depart WMKK at 1815 LT with an estimated flight time of approximately 30 minutes over a distance of about 110 nautical miles.

On the day of incident, the flight departed WMKK at 1916 LT, slightly behind schedule, with no reported technical abnormalities. This sector was the third flight of the day for both the PIC and SIC, whose duty period commenced at 1205 LT. Weather forecasts indicated widespread rain across Peninsular Malaysia throughout the day. The flight proceeded normally in continuous rain conditions and was estimated to arrive at WMKD at 1948 LT. For this sector, the PIC was the Pilot Flying (PF), while the SIC acted as the Pilot Monitoring (PM).

The aircraft was configured for an ILS approach to Runway 36. The PF conducted an arrival briefing, including a discussion of anticipated threats and mitigation measures for potential deviations during the approach and landing, as well as a review of go-around procedures. The Air Traffic Control (ATC) provided the flight crew with the prevailing aerodrome weather information for WMKD issued at 1100 UTC (1900 LT). The reported conditions indicated Runway 36 in IMC, surface wind from 320° at 10 kts, gusting to 16 kts, prevailing visibility of 2,000 meter with rain, cloud reported as few at ground level and scattered at 2,400 ft, air temperature 24 °C, and QNH 1007 hPa.

During the initial approach, above 2,000 ft, the PF reported that both runway edge lights were clearly visible and the aircraft was tracking the correct approach path as depicted in the published approach chart for Runway 36. The aircraft was fully configured for landing and was stabilised by 1,000 ft. Minor deviations were called out by the PM and were promptly corrected by the PF while continuing the approach. At decision altitude, the PF called “continue,” stating that both sides of the runway edge

lights remained visible. Due to the PAPI being unserviceable, the PF relied on visual cues to maintain alignment with the runway centreline.

At approximately below 50 ft RA, during the initial flare, the aircraft drifted slightly to the right of the runway centreline. The PM called “localizer” to highlight the lateral deviation, and corrective control inputs were applied by the PF. However, upon touchdown, the aircraft continued to track right of the runway centreline and subsequently veered off the prepared runway surface. The right main landing gear exited the paved surface onto the adjacent grass area before the aircraft returned to the runway.

The PF reported that he was not aware that the right main landing gear had exited the paved surface during landing. He mentioned that, prior to touchdown, he experienced a slight rightward deviation from the centreline and applied corrective inputs until positive touchdown was achieved. Following touchdown, the aircraft experienced a light bounce, after which the PF steered the aircraft back towards the runway centreline. During this recovery, a momentary vibration was felt, which the PF attributed to the right landing gear contacting a foreign object. Despite being uncertain of the exact cause, the PF was able to taxi the aircraft safely to the designated civil apron. The PIC subsequently informed the aircraft maintenance engineer of the occurrence, suspecting a hard landing and requested ATC to conduct a runway inspection.

In response to the PIC’s report, ground maintenance personnel conducted a physical inspection for a hard landing in accordance with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), and reviewed the aircraft on-line maintenance data from the operator’s headquarters; neither the physical inspection nor the on-line data indicated that a hard landing had occurred. The post-flight inspection identified several deep cuts on the starboard main landing gear wheels, with traces of grass observed within the starboard main landing gear wheel well and the inboard flap area. The condition was assessed as a normal defect rather than damage associated with a runway excursion, and the affected tyres were replaced prior to the occurrence being reported to the AAIB.

A runway inspection conducted by ATC revealed damage to three (3) runway edge lights on the eastern side of the runway. Tyre marks were also observed on the grass strip adjacent to the eastern side of the runway, indicating that a runway excursion had occurred during the landing.

1.2 Injuries to Persons

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others	Total
Fatal	-	-	-	**-**
Serious	-	-	-	**-**
Minor	-	-	-	**-**
None	7	135	-	**142**
Total	**7**	**135**	**-**	**142**

Table 1: Injuries to Persons

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

A post-occurrence inspection of the aircraft was conducted to determine the presence and extent on any damage. No damage was observed to the aircraft structure. However, several deep cuts were identified on the starboard main landing gear wheels, and traces of grass were found within the starboard wheel well and inboard flap area as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

Deep Cuts on the Starboard's Main Wheels

Traces of Grass in Starboard's Wheel Well

Figure 1 : Condition at Starboard's Main Landing Gear Wheels and Wheel Well

Traces of Grass inboard Flap Area



Figure 2: Condition at Inbord Starboard Flap Area

1.4 Other Damage

A general visual inspection of the runway was conducted following the occurrence to assess and identify any damage. The inspection revealed that three (3) runway edge lights on the eastern side of the runway were damaged. In addition, tyre marks were observed on the grass strip adjacent to the eastern side of the runway.

Location one of damaged Runway Edge Light	Location of damaged Runway Edge Light (Close-up)	Damaged Runway Edge Lights
		

Figure 3 : Condition of the Runway Edge Lights

Tyre marks on the grass strip (following the incident)	Tyre marks on the grass strip (At daylight after the incident)	The tyre marks on the grass strip (Close-up)
		

Figure 4: Tyre Marks on Grass Strip of the runway

1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 Pilot Boeing 737-800

Status	Pilot in Command (PIC)
Nationality	Malaysian
Age	52 years old
Gender	Male
License Type	ATPL
License Validity	Valid until 31 July 2026
Aircraft Rating	Multi-Engine Land
Instructor Rating	Nil
Total Hours on Type	8129:32 hrs
Total Flying Hours	8293:43 hrs
Rest Period Since Last Flight	More than 24 hrs
Date of Medical Examination	24 July 2025

1.5.2 Second Pilot Boeing 737-800

Status	Second in Command (SIC)
Nationality	Malaysian
Age	30 years old
Gender	Male
License Type	CPL
License Validity	Valid until 31 May 2026
Aircraft Rating	Multi-Engine Land
Instructor Rating	Nil
Total Hours on Type	1400:01 hrs
Total Flying Hours	1560:31 hrs
Rest Period Since Last Flight	29:03 hrs
Date of Medical Examination	13 May 2025

Both PIC and SIC were licensed, qualified, and approved to perform the flight in accordance with existing regulations**.** The Pilots were medically fit for the flight.

1.6 Aircraft Information

Aircraft Type	Boeing 737-800
Manufacturer	Boeing Company
Year of Manufacturer	May 2004
Owner	Anggerik Labuan Limited
Registration No.	9M-MXU
Aircraft Serial No.	40158
C of A Expiry Date	1 June 2026
C of R Expiry Date	22 May 2026

The aircraft was airworthy when dispatched for the flight and has a valid Certificate of Registration (CoR) and also Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA).

Additional information will be included in the Final Report.

1.7 Meteorological Information

The incident occurred during nightlight hours. Weather conditions at WMKD between 1900 and 2000 LT were characterised by rainfall. Upon the arrival of MH 1276 at WMKD, ATC provided the flight crew with the prevailing Kuantan aerodrome weather information issued at 1100 UTC. The reported conditions indicated runway 36 in IMC, surface wind from 320 degrees at 10 kts, gusting to 16 kts, prevailing visibility of 2,000 m, rain, cloud reported as few at ground level and scattered at 2,400 ft, air temperature 24 °C and QNH 1007 hPa. The following METARs were applicable at the time of the occurrence:

METAR WMKD 271000Z 35007KT 250V050 4000 RA FEW000 SCT024 24/23 Q1006
METAR WMKD 271100Z 28007KT 200V330 2000 +RA FEW000 SCT024 24/23 Q1007
METAR WMKD 271200Z 31007KT 280V360 2000 +RA FEW002 SCT024 23/23 Q1008

Detailed weather data is being collected, focusing on local meteorological conditions around WMKD airfield at the time of the incident, to assess whether any weather-related factors may have influenced Flight MH 1276.

1.8 Aids to Navigation

All navigation aids fitted on the aircraft and installed at WMKD were operational at the time of the occurrence except PAPI Light runway 18/36 and DVOR/DME VKN 113.700 Mhz were unserviceable since 30 September 2025.

1.9 Communications

All ATC communication frequencies were operating normally.

1.10 Aerodrome Information

Kuantan Airport (ICAO: WMKD) also known as Sultan Ahmad Shah Airport is a joint-user military operated airfield. Malaysia Airports Holdings Berhad (MAHB) are responsible towards the operation of civil aircraft on the civil taxiway and aprons. The aerodrome is located approximately 15 km southwest of Kuantan, Pahang and is equipped with a tarmac runway 18/36 measuring about 2,804 metres in length and 46 metres in width. The runway is supported by standard markings and lighting for day and night operations with Taxiway H serving as the taxiway linking the runway to the civil apron. Navigation and approach aids available at the aerodrome include an ILS for Runway 36 VOR/DME and PAPI supporting both IFR and VFR operations. ATC services—comprising Aerodrome Control, Approach Control and Ground Control—are provided by RMAF, with civil operators confined with ground handling of civil aircraft into Sultan Ahmad Shah Airport.

Figure 5: Sultan Ahmad Shah Airport (WMKD)

The aerodrome provides apron facilities capable of supporting commercial narrow-body aircraft, general aviation and government operations. Ground services include passenger handling and aircraft turnaround support are available without refuelling facilities for civil aircraft, while Rescue and Fire-Fighting Services (RFFS) are provided in accordance with ICAO requirements. As a joint-use facility, civil operations may be affected by military exercises, airfield restrictions or maintenance activities which are promulgated through NOTAM. The aerodrome terrain is generally flat with no significant obstacles published along approach or departure paths.

1.11 Flight Recorders

The aircraft B737-800, Registration 9M-MXU was equipped with a Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and a Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). The data from FDR and CVR was downloaded for analysis. Post-incident preservation protocols were not fully implemented, resulting in the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) remaining active for approximately two hour and thirty minutes from the time of incident. Consequently, the aircraft continued to provide power to the recorders, which led to the recorders especially CVR inadvertently overwriting the audio data pertinent to the occurrence.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

Figure 6 illustrates the wreckage and impact information of aircraft 9M-MXU at WMKD on the day of occurrence. The red circle denotes the approximate position of aircraft first touchdown from inbound track runway 36 observed by the ATC from the control tower and the red line represent the aircraft steered on ground onto the adjacent grass area before the aircraft returned to the runway.

Source: CAAM Runway Incursion/Excursion Initial Report

Figure 6: 9M-MXU wreckage and impact information (WMKD)

Following the runway excursion incident, an examination of the aircraft revealed several defects as outlined in Paragraph 1.3. The impact sequence and ground contact evidence were identified through damage to the runway edge lights and disturbance to the adjacent grassed area as detailed in Paragraph 1.4.

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

The pilots underwent a urine drug panel screen and the results were negative for substance abuse.

1.14 Fire

There was no indication of fire inflight or after landing.

1.15 Survival Aspects

Not applicable

1.16 Tests and Research

To be included in Final Report.

1.17 Organisational and Management Information

1.17.1 Aircraft Operator

Malaysia Airlines Berhad (MAB), the national carrier of Malaysia, operates under the Malaysia Aviation Group (MAG) and is headquartered in Kuala Lumpur, with its primary hub at WMKK. The airline's fleet consists of widebody and narrow body aircraft, offering comprehensive flights to both domestic and international destinations across Asia, Europe, and Oceania. Malaysia Airlines is a part of the MAG, which includes subsidiaries such as Firefly, MAB Kargo, and AeroDarat Services, covering various aviation market segments.

1.17.2 Aerodrome Operator

MAHB is the principal aerodrome operator in Malaysia, responsible for the management, operation, maintenance, and development of the nation's airport infrastructure, encompassing international, domestic, and short take-off and landing (STOL) airports. As a corporatized and publicly listed organisation, MAHB provides both aeronautical and non-aeronautical services, ensures compliance with applicable national legislation and international aviation standards, and supports the safe, secure, and efficient conduct of air transport operations in furtherance of national connectivity, economic development, and the sustainability of the aviation sector.

At WMKD, MAHB as the appointed civil aerodrome operator is responsible for the overall administration, operation, and maintenance of the aerodrome to ensure that all airport activities are conducted in a safe and efficient manner and in accordance with

applicable regulatory and international requirements. These responsibilities include the management and maintenance of airside infrastructure such as the runway, taxiways, apron, airfield ground lighting, and associated facilities, as well as the operation of landside and terminal facilities, provision of passenger services, implementation of security arrangements, and coordination of ground handling activities.

1.18 Additional Information

To be included in the Final Report.

1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

To be included in the Final Report.

2.0 ANALYSIS

To be included in the Final Report.

3.0 CONCLUSION

3.1 Preliminary Findings

3.1.1 Pilot

3.1.1.1 Both pilots were properly licenced and qualified for the flight.

3.1.1.2 Both pilots were medically fit before flight.

3.1.2 Aircraft

3.1.2.1 The aircraft had valid CoA and CoR.

3.1.2.2 The aircraft is equipped and maintained in accordance with the existing regulations and approved procedures.

3.1.2.3 The aircraft's starboard main landing gear wheels exhibited several deep cuts.

3.1.2.4 Inspection revealed traces of grass within the aircraft's starboard wheel well and inboard flap area.

3.1.2.5 The FDR and CVR were not isolated following the incident, which resulted in the CVR audio data from the occurrence being overwritten.

3.1.3 Runway

3.1.3.1 Three Runway Edge Light on the eastern side of the runway were found damage.

3.1.3.2 Tyre marks were observed on the grass strip adjacent to the eastern side of the runway

3.1.3.3 The PAPI lights for runway 18/36 had been unserviceable since 30 September 2025.

Additional findings shall be included in the Final Report. The information and findings contained in this report are preliminary and remain subject to amendment should further relevant evidence become available.

3.2 Probable Cause

To be included in the Final Report.

4.0 IMMEDIATE SAFETY ACTIONS

4.1 Aircraft Operator

4.1.1 The aircraft operator is recommended to encourage prompt and accurate reporting of incident to ensure timely action and enhance overall safety

4.2 Aerodrome Operator

4.2.1 The damaged Runway Edge Lights should be promptly repaired or replaced. Until repairs are completed, the affected lights should be clearly marked as unserviceable and flight operations should be conducted with caution with NOTAMs issued to alert pilots.

4.2.2 Maintenance for PAPI lights Runway 18/36 should be scheduled as soon as possible to restore full functionality.

Other safety recommendations will be included in the Final Report.

INVESTIGATOR IN-CHARGE
Air Accident Investigation Bureau
Ministry of Transport Malaysia