



AIRCRAFT SERIOUS INCIDENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

SI 03/26

**Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB)
Ministry of Transport, Malaysia**

**Fixed Wing Aircraft Boeing B737-300F, Registration PK-MBM
at Kuching International Airport, Malaysia
on 3 May 2026**



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PRELIMINARY REPORT SI 03/26

**AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BUREAU (AAIB)
MALAYSIA**

REPORT NO: SI 03/26

OPERATOR	: PT. RAFFLES GLOBAL ANGKASA
AIRCRAFT TYPE	: BOEING 737-300F
NATIONALITY OF AIRCRAFT	: INDONESIA
REGISTRATION	: PK-MBM
PLACE OF OCCURRENCE	: KUCHING INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, SARAWAK, MALAYSIA
DATE AND TIME	: 3 MAY 2026 AT 0751LT

This report contains statements of facts which have been determined up to the time of issue. It must be regarded as tentative and is subjected to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available.

The sole objective of the investigation is the prevention of accidents and incidents. In accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, it is not the purpose of this investigation to apportion blame or liability.

All times in this report are Local Time (LT) unless stated otherwise. LT is UTC + 8 hours.

INTRODUCTION

The Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) is the air accident and serious incident investigation authority in Malaysia and is responsible to the Minister of Transport. Its mission is to promote aviation safety through the conduct of independent and objective investigations into air accidents and serious incidents.

The AAIB conducts these investigations in accordance with Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, the Civil Aviation Act of Malaysia 1969, and the Civil Aviation Regulations of Malaysia 2016.

It is inappropriate that AAIB reports should be used to assign fault or blame or determine liability since neither the investigations nor the reporting processes have been undertaken for that purpose.

In accordance with ICAO Annex 13 paragraph 4.1, notification of this serious incident was sent out on 8 May 2026 to the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) Indonesia as the State of Registration and the State of Operator, to the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM) and National Transport Safety Board (NTSB), United States of America as the State of Design and Manufacture.

Unless otherwise indicated, recommendations in this report are addressed to the investigating or regulatory authorities of the State having responsibility for the matters with which the recommendations are concerned. It is for those authorities to decide what action is to be taken.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A

AAIB	Air Accident Investigation Bureau
AFRS	Airport Fire & Rescue Service
ATC	Air Traffic Controller
AJL	Aircraft Journey Log
AMM	Aircraft Maintenance Manual
ASV	Airside Safety Vehicles
ACN	Asia Cargo Network

B

BCF	Boeing Converted Freighter
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C

CAAM	Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia
C of A	Certificate of Airworthiness
C of R	Certificate of Registration
CVR	Cockpit Voice Recorder
CAD	Civil Aviation Directive
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television

D

DE	Duty Executive
DGCA	Directorate General of Civil Aviation

E

EOB	Engineer On Board
FOD	Foreign Object Debris

F

FDR	Flight Data Recorder
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I

IATA	International Air Transport Association
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ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
K	
KCH	IATA Code for Kuala Lumpur International Airport
KUL	IATA Code for Kuching International Airport
M	
MWA	Main Wheel Assembly
MAHB	Malaysia Airport Holding Berhad
MASB	Malaysia Airport Sdn Berhad
MOR	Mandatory Occurrence Report
MSL	Mean Sea Level
O	
OM	Operations Manual
P	
PIC	Pilot in Command
PT	Perseroan Terbatas
POS ACE	Pos Asia Cargo Express
R	
RH	Right Hand
RGA	Raffles Global Angkasa
S	
SMC	Surface Movement Control
SSFDR	Solid State Flight Data Recorder
SMS	Safety Management System
W	
WCA	World Cargo Airline
WMKK	ICAO Code for Kuala Lumpur International Airport
WBGG	ICAO Code for Kuching International Airport

SYNOPSIS

On 3 May 2026, a Boeing 737-300F operated by Perseroan Terbatas (PT) Raffles Global Angkasa (RGA), registered as PK-MBM, and operating a scheduled cargo flight from WMKK to WBGG, was involved in a serious incident when the RH Main Wheel Assembly (MWA) Tyres No. 3 and No. 4 experienced tyre bursts during the take-off roll and rotation.

The aircraft carrying four (4) crew¹ members departed WMKK at 2221 UTC and continued the flight to WBGG, where it landed safely at 2351 UTC. Preliminary examination identified tyre debris scattered across several locations at both WMKK and WBGG.

The *catastrophic* failure resulted in extensive damage to RH MWA No. 3 and No. 4, including tyre disintegration and fragmentation. Secondary damage was identified on several aircraft structures, including punctures, cracking, and structural rupture caused by detached tyre and wheel assembly fragments. No injuries were reported to the flight crew or other personnel.

A Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) was submitted to the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM) and the Air Accident Investigation Bureau, Malaysia (AAIB) was notified of the incident by the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), Indonesia on 5 May 2026. The investigation team was subsequently dispatched to the occurrence site on the following day.

¹ **Crew** means Captain, First Officer, Loadmaster and Engineer.

1.0 FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of the Flight

On 3 May 2026, a Boeing B737-300F aircraft, registration PK-MBM, operated by PT. RGA under a Wet Lease-In² arrangement with World Cargo Airlines (WCA), was scheduled to operate cargo Flight 3G6602 from WMKK to WBGG.

At 2140 UTC, the flight crew arrived at the aircraft parked at Bay F25R and conducted a pre-flight inspection. According to the Engineer on Board (EOB) statement, no abnormalities or defects were identified, and the aircraft was found satisfactory condition for flight operations.

Between 2142 UTC and 2150 UTC, scheduled runway sweeping operations were conducted on Runway 14R/32L at WMKK. Following completion of the sweeping activities, the runway was inspected, declared serviceable, and reopened for normal operations. On the day of the occurrence, Runway 14R at WMKK was primarily utilised for aircraft departure operations.

At 2155 UTC, aircraft refueling and cargo loading activities were completed. The aircraft subsequently departed from the parking bay, and pushback and engine start procedures were carried out without any abnormalities. The aircraft then taxied for departure to Runway 14R via Intersection C2, as illustrated in Figure 1.

At 2221 UTC, flight PK-MBM departed WMKK. According to the crew statement, the take-off roll and rotation were normal, with no abnormal indications, unusual vibrations, or aircraft handling issues experienced during departure. The climb, cruise, and descent phases were also reported to have been conducted normally.

² **Wet lease-In** is an agreement between air operators pursuant to which the aircraft is operated under the AOC of the lessor. It is normally a lease of an aircraft with crew, operated under the commercial control of the lessee and using the lessee's designator code and traffic rights.




Figure 1: PK-MBM Taxi Route From Parking Bay F25R to Runway 14R Prior to Departure

Between 2221 UTC and 2303 UTC, a total of four (4) aircraft movements utilised Runway 14R for departure operations prior to debris being reported on the runway by another aircraft taking off.

At 2303 UTC, the Tower Supervisor informed the Duty Executive (DE) regarding the presence of debris on Runway 14R/32L and prompting Airside Safety personnel to initiate inspection and FOD removal operations.

Approximately one (1) hour was required to complete FOD removal and runway inspection operations, involving six (6) Airside Safety Vehicles (ASV) and four (4) runway sweepers. Consequently, Runway 14R/32L was closed until 0030 UTC to facilitate debris clearance and runway inspection activities.



Figure 2: FOD Recovered on Runway 14R/32L
Between Intersections C2 and C7 at WMKK

Following the occurrence, tyre debris was observed scattered along Runway 14R/32L, extending from Intersection C2 to Intersection C7. Figure 2 illustrates the recovered debris, which comprised approximately 58.375 kg of rubber material and 18.756 kg of metallic fragments, as further illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.




Figure 3: Sample of Recovered Tyre Rubber Debris




Figure 4: Sample of Recovered Metallic Fragments

Additionally, continuous scratch marks approximately 2 km in length were identified on the runway pavement, extending from Intersection P4 to Intersection C7. Upon completion of debris clearance and a full-length runway inspection, Runway 14R/32L was handed back to Air Traffic Control (ATC) and reopened for normal operations at 0027 UTC.

At 2351 UTC, flight PK-MBM landed on Runway 25 at WBGG. The flight crew reported no abnormalities during the en-route phase of the flight. Following touchdown, the flight crew reported that the aircraft exhibited a tendency to veer towards the right side of the runway, prompting the Pilot in Command (PIC) to disengage the autobrake system and apply reverse thrust to maintain directional control of the aircraft. The aircraft subsequently vacated the runway via Taxiway A3 and proceeded to Parking Bay 10B, where it was brought to a complete stop and secured with wheel chocks.

Following completion of the flight and engine shutdown procedures, damage to the aircraft was identified by the flight crew. Subsequent post-flight inspection revealed that MWA No. 3 and No. 4 on the RH had disintegrated, resulting in extensive damage to multiple aircraft structures and associated components.

At 0020 UTC, the PK-MBM flight crew informed Surface Movement Control (SMC) that the aircraft had experienced tyre bursts, resulting in FOD being scattered along Taxiway A3. Refer to Figure 5 for further details. The information was subsequently relayed to the Tower Supervisor for further action to coordinate debris removal and runway/taxiway clearance operations.




Figure 5: FOD Found on Runway 25 at WBGG

During the runway inspection conducted by Airside Safety Personnel, continuous scratch marks were observed on the pavement surface extending from the 750 ft marker on Runway 25 to Parking Bay 10B, corresponding to the path travelled by PK-MBM until the aircraft came to a complete stop.

Airside Operations personnel subsequently conducted final runway sweeping and inspection activities on Runway 25 and the associated taxiways. Upon completion of debris removal and a full-length runway inspection, Runway 25 was handed back to Air Traffic Control (ATC) and reopened for normal operations at 0100 UTC.

The aircraft was declared unserviceable and grounded at WBGG by the operator pending further rectification actions. No injuries were reported among the flight crew or other personnel

1.2 Injuries to Persons

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others	Total
Fatal	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Serious	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Minor	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
None	4	NIL	NIL	4

There was no injury to any of the aircraft occupants or personnel on ground

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

A general visual inspection was conducted to assess the extent of damage sustained by the aircraft following the occurrence. No damage was identified to the fuselage or associated major components on the port of the aircraft.

However, substantial damage was observed in the area beneath the RH wing and MWA as illustrated in Figure 6 to Figure 20. MWA Tyres No. 3 and No. 4 were found to have disintegrated, resulting in extensive damage to adjacent aircraft structures and associated components.

Preliminary examination indicated that the RH wing had sustained multiple impact-related damages, including structural punctures, tearing, cracking, and rupture caused by high energy impacts from fragmented tyre debris, detached bolts, and other part generated during the tyre disintegration event.

In addition, the horizontal stabilizer exhibited puncture and penetration damage, which was assessed as being consistent with high-velocity fragments travelling aft following the tyre failure.



Figure 6: MWA No. 3 & No. 4 Damaged



Figure 7: RH Canoe No 4 Ruptured



Figure 8: RH Ground Spoiler No 5 Ruptured




Figure 9: RH Skin Leading Edge Horizontal Stabilizer Punctured




Figure 10: RH Upper Middle Tailing Edge Flap Panel Crushed




Figure 11: RH Inboard Aft Trailing Edge Flap Ruptured

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Figure 12: RH Inboard Trailing Edge Flap Dented



Figure 13: RH Inboard Lower Tank Dented



Figure 14: RH Lower Panel Main Landing Gear Ruptured



Figure 15: RH Aft Lower Wing Root Panel Ruptured




Figure 16: RH Inboard Leading Edge Flap Punctured




Figure 17: RH Inboard Fore Trailing Edge Flap Punctured




Figure 18: Lower Aft Panel RH Main Landing Gear Ruptured



Figure 19: RH Outer, Centre and Inner Doors Main Landing Gear Broken and Fractured




Figure 20: Upper Panel RH Main Landing Gear Cracked

1.4 Other Damage

The aircraft taxied normally from Parking Bay F25R to Runway 14R via Taxiways K, D7, C, and C2 before reaching the threshold and departing at 2221 UTC. Following the occurrence, airport personnel discovered tyre debris and aircraft fragments, as illustrated in Figure 21, distributed along Runway 14R from Intersection C2 to Intersection C7, with an estimated debris field extending approximately 2.5 km. The debris distribution was consistent with disintegration of the affected main wheel tyre assembly during the occurrence.

Subsequent examination of Runway 14R/32L at WMKK identified continuous scratch marks and pavement abrasion on the asphalt surface extending from Intersection P4 to Intersection C7 over an approximate distance of 2 km. The observed pavement scoring and abrasion were consistent with contact between the exposed wheel hub and the runway surface following tyre failure.




Figure 21: Pictures of Pavement Scratches and Tyre Debris Observed at WMKK

Damage to aerodrome surfaces was also identified at WBGG following the occurrence. Examination of the affected areas revealed runway surface marks, pavement abrasion, and tyre debris associated with the disintegration of the affected MWA.

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At WBGG, the initial scratch marks were identified approximately 750 ft from the runway marker and continued along the aircraft ground track after the aircraft vacated the runway via Taxiway A3. Continuous scratch marks were subsequently observed along the aircraft taxi route through Apron A3, Taxiway H, the Main Apron, Taxiways B, A, and L, extending to Parking Bay 10B. The occurrence also resulted in damage to three (3) taxiway inset lights located in the vicinity of Taxiway A3, as illustrated in Figure 22.




Figure 22: Pavement Scratches on Runway 25 and Damage to Taxiway Inset Lights at WBGG

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1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 Pilot in Command (PIC) Second in Command (SIC)

Status	Pilot in Command (PIC)
Nationality	Indonesia
Age	47 years old
Gender	Male
License Type	ATPL
License Validity	Valid until 31 July 2026
Aircraft Rating	B737
Total Hours on Type	8,265 hrs
Total Flying Hours	15,862:40 hrs
Rest Period Since Last Flight	68:30 hrs
Date of Medical Examination	19 May 2026

1.5.2 Second in Command (SIC)

Status	Second in Command (SIC)
Nationality	Indonesia
Age	25 years old
Gender	Male
License Type	CPL
License Validity	Valid until 30 June 2026
Aircraft Rating	B737
Total Hours on Type	1,084:17 hrs
Total Flying Hours	1,234:37 hrs
Rest Period Since Last Flight	37:30 hrs
Date of Medical Examination	20 October 2026

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Both pilots were licensed, qualified, and approved to operate the flight in accordance with existing regulations. They were also medically fit and adequately rested.

1.6 Aircraft Information

Aircraft Type	Boeing B737-300F
Manufacturer	Boeing Company
Year of Manufacturer	1997
Owner	TM AIRCRAFT 28860 LIMITED
Registration No.	PK-MBM
Aircraft Serial No.	28869
C of A Expiry Date	10 October 2026
C of R Expiry Date	29 September 2028

The aircraft was airworthy when dispatched for the flight, with a valid registration and Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A). It was maintained in compliance with regulations. Maintenance records show that the aircraft is equipped and maintained according to existing regulations and approved procedures.

Additional information will be included in the Final Report.

1.7 Meteorological Information

According to the METAR report, during the pre-flight walkaround check at the parking position, there were no rain conditions or other factors that could have affected visibility, such as fog. The weather as a whole had no influence on the execution of the check and did not contribute to the incident.

1.7.1 Weather Condition at WMKK

The weather condition at WMKK will be included in the Final Report.

1.7.2 Weather Condition at WBGG

METAR WBGG 022300Z 00000KT 9999 FEW020 24/24 Q1009 NOSIG RMK F01 P0.0 R98=

METAR WBGG 022330Z 00000KT 9999 FEW020 25/24 Q1009 NOSIG RMK F02 R98=

METAR WBGG 030000Z 00000KT 9999 FEW012 25/25 Q1010 NOSIG RMK F01 P0.0 R98=

METAR WBGG 030030Z VRB03KT 9999 FEW012 27/26 Q1010 NOSIG RMK F02 R93=

1.8 Aids to Navigation

All navigation aids fitted on the aircraft and installed at WMKK and WBGG were operational at the time of the occurrence.

1.9 Communications

At the time of the incident, the aircraft was in contact with WMKK and WBGG's Area Control, and there was continuous two-way communication between the aircraft and ATC frequencies, which were operating normally.

1.10 Aerodrome Information

The Serious Incident involved operations at WMKK and WBGG. Relevant information pertaining to both aerodromes is provided below.

1.10.1 WMKK Aerodrome

Kuala Lumpur International Airport (IATA: KUL, ICAO: WMKK), located in Sepang, Selangor, approximately 45 km south of Kuala Lumpur city center, serves as the principal international gateway to Malaysia. The airport is situated at coordinates N2°44.85' / E101°42.59' and operates three runways: Runway 14L/32R (4,000 m), Runway 14R/32L (4,056 m), and Runway 15/33 (3,960 m). The aerodrome elevation is approximately 21 meters above Mean Sea Level (MSL).




Figure 23: Aerial View of Kuala Lumpur International Airport
(Source: Google Earth)

1.10.2 WBGG Aerodrome

Kuching International Airport (IATA: KCH, ICAO: WBGG) is the primary international gateway to Sarawak, located approximately 11 km South of Kuching city centre. The airport's coordinates are N1°29.12' / E110°20.70'. It features a single runway, Runway 07/25, with a length of approximately 3,800 meters and an elevation of about 26.82 meters above MSL.



Figure 24: Aerial View of Kuching International Airport
(Source: Google Earth)

1.11 Flight Recorders

The aircraft (PK-MBM) was equipped with both a Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and a Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). Data from both recorders were downloaded on 11 May 2026 at AAIB's Flight Recorder Laboratory for analysis. Details of the FDR and CVR are as follows.

Description	Flight Data Recorder	Cockpit Voice Recorder
Part No.	980-4700-00	2100-1020-00
Serial No.	2038	00454
Manufacturer	Honeywell	Fairchild
Model	SSFDR	FA 2100 CVR
Date of Manufacture	February 1997	March 1999

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

The occurrence did not involve aircraft breakup or terrain impact. Figure 25 and Figure 26 below provides a general description of the site and the debris distribution at WMKK and WBGG.

KL International Airport
Taxiway & Bay category

LEGEND
Taxiway/airline arrival code
TAXIWAY/TAXIWAY CODE F - ALL TYPE BELOW CAN USE.
TAXIWAY/TAXIWAY CODE F (ALTERNATE TO CODE F WITH RESTRICTION)
TAXIWAY/TAXIWAY CODE C ONLY
Aircraft have to be slow to SAE Hanger / Airbus Hanger
Aircraft parking/Bay Type
NARROW BODY AERODROMED BAYS
WIDE BODY AERODROMED BAYS
WIDE BODY AERODROMED BAYS WITH MAINS CAPABILITIES
NARROW BODY OPEN BAYS
WIDE BODY OPEN BAYS
WIDE BODY OPEN BAYS WITH MAINS CAPABILITIES
CARGO BAYS (BAYS CAPABILITIES)
HANGER BAYS
NLA BAY AERODROMED - C10, C16, C17, C18, C19, C20, C21, C22, C23
NLA BAY OPEN BAYS - C10, C17 & C18
NLA BAY (BAY) - CRITICAL AIRCRAFT STAY-AGE & MAINTENANCE ONLY

Runway 32L
Runway 14R

Legend:
P4 – C7 – Scratch Marks on Runway Approximate 2km
C2 – C7 – Tyre Debris Scattered Along the Runway Approximate 2.5km
PK-MBM

An aerial photograph of Kuching International Airport (KIA) with various runways and taxiways labeled. Yellow arrows point from three specific locations on the runway to three inset photographs below. The first arrow points from the area between RWY 07 and TWY A3 to a photo of a tire on the tarmac. The second arrow points from the area between TWY A2 and TWY A1 to a photo of debris on the tarmac. The third arrow points from the area between TWY A1 and RWY 25 to a photo of a large, circular, shallow crater in the pavement. A pink arrow labeled 'LANDING' points towards the right end of the runway, with a red airplane icon labeled 'PK-MBM' above it. The airport is surrounded by residential areas and greenery.

19

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

The pilot did not undergo urine drug panel and blood alcohol screening. Detailed medical and pathological information could not be established due to the delayed notification of the occurrence to the investigation team.

1.14 Fire

There was no evidence of a fire inflight or after landing.

1.15 Survival Aspects

Not applicable.

1.16 Tests and Research

To be included in the Final Report.

1.17 Organisational and Management Information

1.17.1 The Lessee (WCA Sdn. Bhd.)

WCA (the Lessee) is a Malaysia-based cargo operator specialising in domestic and international air freight transportation services. The company was formerly known as Pos Asia Cargo Express (POS ACE) before undergoing restructuring and rebranding as WCA. Its core operations include scheduled and charter cargo services, mail and parcel transportation, and logistics support utilising Boeing B737 freighter aircraft. WCA primarily operates from WMKK, which serves as its principal operational hub.

The company has operated various Boeing B737 freighter variants, including the Boeing B737-300F, Boeing B737-400F, and Boeing B737-800 Boeing Converted Freighter (BCF), to support domestic and regional cargo operations. At the time of the occurrence, WCA's cargo fleet consisted of Boeing B737-400F and Boeing B737-800BCF aircraft.

At the time of the occurrence, WCA operated aircraft PK-MBM under a lease arrangement with PT. RGA, the Lessor. As the Lessee and operational operator, WCA was responsible for the aircraft's operation, including regulatory compliance, safety management, operational approvals, fuel arrangements, ground and cargo handling, aircraft security, maintenance coordination, and support for continuing airworthiness in accordance with the lease agreement and applicable aviation regulations.

1.17.2 The Lessor (PT. RGA)

PT. RGA (the Lessor) is an Indonesian cargo airline operator and a member of the Asia Cargo Network (ACN) Group, holding Air Operator Certificate (AOC) No. 023 issued by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) of Indonesia. The company provides domestic and international air cargo transportation services and operates Boeing B737 freighter aircraft within Indonesia and the Asia region. At the time of the occurrence, RGA was the registered owner and Lessor of aircraft PK-MBM, which was operated by World Cargo Airline Sdn. Bhd. (WCA) under a lease arrangement. Being the Lessor, PT. RGA shall include the provision of the following items:

- i) Provision of the Aircraft under Lessor's registration.
- ii) Provision of the required licensed cockpit Crew.
- iii) Provision of the full aircraft maintenance program for flight operations.
- iv) Provision of the aviation, hull, third party and cargo insurance

1.17.3 Proactive Measures Taken by the Aircraft Operator

The aircraft operator took proactive measures by engaging Boeing for technical assistance in performing temporary repairs prior to the aircraft undergoing permanent rectification, which is to be determined later.

1.18 Additional Information

At the time of the occurrence, WMKK was operating under normal traffic conditions. Following the occurrence involving PK-MBM, Runway 14R/32L was temporarily closed from 2304 UTC until 0027 UTC to facilitate runway inspection, debris recovery, FOD removal, and pavement condition assessment.

During the runway closure period, aircraft operations were affected, resulting in disruptions to arriving and departing traffic. However, the situation was effectively managed using Runway 15/33 for aircraft operations until Runway 14R/32L was declared serviceable and reopened for normal operations.

1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

To be included in the Final Report.

2.0 ANALYSIS

To be included in the Final Report.

3.0 CONCLUSION

3.1 Findings

3.1.1 Pilot

- i) Both pilots were qualified and approved to perform the flight in accordance with existing regulations.
- ii) Both pilots were medically fit and adequately rested to operate the flight.
- iii) The PIC informed SMC at WBGG of the occurrence approximately 30 minutes after PK-MBM had parked at Bay 10B. PIC should have reported the occurrence to the appropriate ATC facility without delay.

3.1.2 Aircraft

- i) The aircraft was airworthy when cleared for the flight.
- ii) The aircraft is certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures.
- iii) The aircraft has a valid Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) and has been maintained in compliance with regulations.
- iv) Maintenance records indicate that the aircraft is equipped and maintained according to existing regulations and approved procedures.
- v) The CVR was successfully retrieved during the investigation. However, it did not contain any relevant information, as the recorded data had been overwritten.
- vi) Multiple aircraft structures sustained punctures and rupture consistently with impacts from fragmented tyre debris and detached wheel assembly parts following the disintegration of RH MWA Tyres No. 3 and No. 4.

3.1.3 Aerodrome WMKK and WBGG

- i) The runway surfaces at WMKK and WBGG sustained continuous scratch marks and pavement abrasion consistent with contact between the exposed wheel hub and the pavement following the disintegration of RH MWA Tyres No. 3 and No. 4.
- ii) The three (3) taxiway inset lights located in the vicinity of Taxiway A3 at WBGG were found damaged.

3.1.4 The Lessee (WCA Sdn. Bhd.)

- i) At the time of the occurrence, the Lessee had been appointed by Pos Malaysia Berhad (PMB) to provide cargo transportation services between Kuala Lumpur and Kuching.

- ii) Responsible for overseeing and monitoring flight operations to ensure compliance with its commercial requirements.

3.1.5 The Lessor (PT. RGA)

- i) Entered an agreement with the Lessee for the provision of one (1) Boeing 737-300F aircraft, registration PK-MBM, Manufacturer's Serial Number 28869, or an equivalent substitute aircraft for cargo flight operations.

Further findings will be presented in the Final Report, and the current findings remain subject to revision should additional evidence become available.

3.2 Probable Cause

To be included in the Final Report.

4.0 IMMEDIATE SAFETY ACTIONS

4.1 The Lessee (WCA Sdn. Bhd.)

4.1.1 In accordance with WCA's SMS dated 1 May 2026, Paragraph 15.5.1.2, WCA is recommended to enhance its SMS by requiring flight crew members involved in an accident or serious incident to undergo medical and toxicological examinations, including alcohol and drug screening.

4.2 The Lessor (PT. RGA)

4.2.1 PT. RGA is recommended to establish clear procedures in OM Part A, Chapter 11, Paragraph 11.5, to ensure that flight crew members involved in an accident or serious incident undergo appropriate medical, pathological and toxicological examinations, as soon as practicable following the occurrence in accordance with the guidance provided in ICAO Doc 9756, Part IV, Third Edition 2020, Paragraph 1.13 - Medical and pathological information.

4.2.2 PT. RGA is recommended to establish clear procedures in OM Part A, Chapter 11, Paragraph 11.5, where the PIC must ensure the CVR circuit breakers are "pulled" after engine shutdown following serious incidents or accidents to prevent overwritten of recorded data in accordance with the guidance provided in ICAO Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft, Part I twelfth Edition, July 2022, Paragraph 6.3.5 Flight Recorders – General.

4.3 Aerodrome WMKK and WBGG

4.3.1 MAHB and MASB are recommended to install CCTV systems covering runway end areas to facilitate continuous monitoring by duty personnel and support the timely identification of abnormal events, hazards or aircraft occurrences.

4.3.2 The aerodrome operator is recommended to inspect, repair or replace, and verify the serviceability of the damaged taxiway inset lights near Taxiway A3.

Other safety recommendations will be included in the Final Report.

**Investigator-in-charge
AAIB
Ministry of Transport Malaysia**