



AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

A 11/26

**Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB)
Ministry of Transport Malaysia**

**Helicopter BOLKOW BO105,
Registration 9M-LLF at STOLPort Long Lellang, Miri, Sarawak
on 8 September 2026**



Air Accident Investigation Bureau
Ministry of Transport
No.26, Jalan Tun Hussein, Precinct 4
Federal Government Administrative Centre
62100 PUTRAJAYA
Phone: +603-8892 1072
+603-8892 8080
E-mail: AAIB@mot.gov.my
Website: <http://www.mot.gov.my/en>

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AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BUREAU (AAIB) MALAYSIA

PRELIMINARY REPORT NO: A 11/26

OPERATOR	: LAYANG LAYANG AEROSPACE SDN. BHD.
AIRCRAFT TYPE	: BULKOW BO105 S
AIRCRAFT NATIONALITY	: MALAYSIA
REGISTRATION	: 9M-LLF
PLACE OF OCCURRENCE	: STOLPORT LONG LELLANG, MIRI, SARAWAK
DATE AND TIME	: 8 SEPTEMBER 2026 AT 1530 LT (0730 UTC)

This preliminary report contains statement of facts which have been determined up to the time of issue only. It must be regarded as tentative, and is subject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available.

This investigation is carried out to determine the circumstances and causes of the accident with a view to the preservation of life and the avoidance of accident or incident in the future. It is not the purpose of this investigation to apportion blame or liability (Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention and Civil Aviation Regulations 2016).

All times in this report are Local Time (LT) unless stated otherwise. LT is UTC +8 hours.

INTRODUCTION

The Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) is the air accident and serious incident investigation authority in Malaysia and is responsible to the Minister of Transport. Its mission is to promote aviation safety through the conduct of independent and objective investigations into air accidents and serious incidents.

The AAIB conducts these investigations in accordance with Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, the Civil Aviation Act of Malaysia 1969, and the Civil Aviation Regulations of Malaysia 2016.

It is inappropriate that AAIB reports should be used to assign fault or blame or determine liability since neither the investigations nor the reporting processes have been undertaken for that purpose.

In accordance with ICAO Annex 13 paragraph 4.1, notification of the accident was sent out on 9 September 2026 to ICAO, the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) as the State of Manufacture, The National Transport Safety Board (NTSB), United States of America as the State of Manufacture of the aircraft's engine, the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM) and the Aircraft Operator.

Unless otherwise indicated, recommendations in this report are addressed to the investigating or regulatory authorities of the State having responsibility for the matters with which the recommendations are concerned. It is for those authorities to decide what action is to be taken.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A

AAIB	Air Accident Investigation Bureau
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATS	Air Traffic Services
AVSEC	Aviation Security

B

BFU	German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (<i>Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung</i>)
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C

CAAM	Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia
CoA	Certificate of Airworthiness
CoR	Certificate of Registration
CPL	Commercial Pilot Licence
CVR	Cockpit Voice Recorder

D

DME	Distance Measuring Equipment
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F

FDR	Flight Data Recorder
FDS	Flying Doctor Service
FIS	Flight Information Service
ft	Feet

I

IATA	International Air Transport Association
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ILS	Instrument Landing System

J

JBPM	Fire and Rescue Department
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K

kg	Kilogramme
kts	Knots

L

LLA	Layang-Layang Aerospace Sdn. Bhd.
LT	Local Time

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M

MASB	Malaysia Airports Sdn. Bhd.
MOH	Ministry of Health Malaysia
MOR	Mandatory Occurrence Report

N

NM	Nautical Mile
NTSB	National Transportation Safety Board

P

PIC	Pilot in Command
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment

R

RELA	Malaysia Volunteers Corps Department
RMP	Royal Malaysian Police

S

SMS	Safety Management System
STOLport	Short Take Off and Landing port

U

UTC	Coordinated Universal Time
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V

VFR	Visual Flight Rules
VOR	Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range

W

WBGF	Long Lellang STOLport
WBGR	Miri Airport

SYNOPSIS

On 8 September 2026, a Bolkow BO105 helicopter, registration 9M-LLF, operating under the callsign MEDIC3, was conducting a scheduled Flying Doctor Service (FDS) flight with one pilot and four passengers on board. The helicopter departed Miri at approximately 1015 LT and subsequently landed at Ba'Lai at approximately 1139 LT. Following a period on the ground, the helicopter departed Ba'Lai at approximately 1336 LT and landed at Selungo at approximately 1402 LT, where it was subsequently refuelled. No abnormal occurrence during these sectors has been identified from the information currently available to the investigation.

At approximately 1517 LT, the helicopter departed Selungo for Long Lellang STOLport. The last position recorded by the Spider Track system was approximately 3 NM from Long Lellang STOLport, after which no further position data were available. A 37-second ground-based video recording captured the final portion of the flight, showing the helicopter in flight with a visible smoke trail and apparent flames in the vicinity of the area aft of the main gearbox. The helicopter continued towards Long Lellang STOLport and was observed approaching Runway 04. The helicopter was subsequently located near the Runway 04 threshold. The circumstances in which it contacted the ground remain under investigation. The helicopter was destroyed in the accident.

The Aircraft Operator submitted a Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) to the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM). The AAIB was notified of the occurrence on the same day and investigators were despatched to Miri, Sarawak on the very next day,. The team arrived at the accident site on the third day following the accident, using an Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) helicopter.

1.0 FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of the Flight

On 8 September 2026, a Bolkow BO105 helicopter, bearing registration 9M-LLF and operating under the callsign MEDIC3, was conducting a scheduled Flying Doctor Service (FDS) flight. The flight crew consisted of one pilot and 4 passengers.

Based on the available operational information and Spider Track¹ records, the helicopter was recorded as starting up at approximately 1015 LT. It subsequently departed Miri at 1024 LT and proceeded towards Ba'Lai without any reported abnormalities.

The helicopter arrived at Ba'Lai and landed at approximately 1139 LT. Following landing, the helicopter was shut down. No abnormal event during the Miri to Ba'Lai sector has been identified from the information currently available to the investigation. The operational and technical status of the helicopter during this sector remains subject to further verification.

Following a period on the ground at Ba'Lai, the helicopter was recorded as starting up again at approximately 1336 LT. The helicopter subsequently departed Ba'Lai and proceeded towards Selungo.

According to the available Spider Track information, the helicopter arrived at Selungo and landed at approximately 1402 LT. Following landing, the helicopter was shut down. The helicopter was subsequently refueled at Selungo in preparation for the next flight. No abnormal occurrence during the Ba'Lai to Selungo sector has been established based on the information currently available to the investigation.

Following refueling at Selungo, the helicopter was recorded as starting up at approximately 1517 LT and subsequently departed towards Long Lellang STOLport. The available Spider Track information indicates that the last recorded helicopter position was at approximately 1527 LT, when the helicopter was approximately 3 NM

¹ Spider Track is a satellite-based flight tracking and safety system for aircraft. It uses a small cockpit hardware device (a "Spider") connected to the satellite network to transmit real-time data—like an aircraft's GPS location, speed, and altitude—back to a live digital map on the ground. It also features automated SOS alerting to instantly notify ground crews in emergencies

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from Long Lellang STOLport. No further helicopter position information was available from the Spider Track record after this point.

A 37-second video recording made by a person on the ground provides visual information concerning the final portion of the flight. An initial examination of the video shows the helicopter in flight with a visible trail of smoke. Visible flames were also observed in the vicinity of the area aft of the main gearbox, as viewed in the recording. The helicopter was subsequently observed continuing towards Long Lellang STOLport. The recording shows the helicopter continuing towards the STOLport and approaching Runway 04 but does not show how it subsequently contacted the ground. When the first responders approached the accident site, the helicopter was engulfed in fire near the Runway 04 threshold. The helicopter was substantially destroyed by the fire.



Figure 1: Photos from video recording footage from witness on ground

1.2 Injuries to Persons

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others	Total
Fatal	1	4	NIL	5
Serious	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Minor	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
None	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL

The pilot and all the passenger were fatally injured.

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

Initial examination indicates that the helicopter was substantially destroyed by fire and damage associated with ground contact. Small items of debris were identified within the accident site and were recovered and transported to Miri for further examination and analysis. A detailed assessment of the damage sustained by the helicopter will be conducted, and the findings will be included in the Final Report.

1.4 Other Damage

No damage to surrounding structures, property, or other objects was identified in the vicinity of the accident site.

1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 Pilot

Status	Pilot in Command (PIC)
Nationality	Malaysian
Age	30 years old
Gender	Male
License Type	CPL (H)
License Validity	Valid until 31 January 2027
Aircraft Rating	BO 105

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Instructor Rating	Nil
Total Hours on Type	915:50 hrs
Total Flying Hours	1825:30 hrs
Flying hours in last 90 days	81:48 hrs
Rest Period Since Last Flight	22:00 hrs
Date of Medical Examination	26 January 2026
Medical certificate validity	31 January 2027

The pilot held the appropriate licence, qualifications, and approvals required to conduct the flight in accordance with the applicable regulations. The pilot held a valid medical certificate and was medically fit to conduct the flight.

1.6 Aircraft Information

The Bolkow BO 105 S is a light, twin-engine, four-bladed, fully articulated main rotor helicopter manufactured by Bolkow GmbH (Germany). It is powered by two Rolls-Royce/Allison 250-C20B turboshaft engines and features a rigid rotor system with a four-bladed main rotor and a two-bladed tail rotor. The helicopter is designed for a variety of operations, including passenger transport, utility, medical evacuation and other specialised missions. The BO 105 S has a maximum take-off mass of approximately 2,500 kg depending on the applicable configuration and helicopter documentation.




Figure 2: Three views of the helicopter

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Aircraft Type	MBB - BO105 S
Manufacturer	EUROCOPTER DEUTSCHLAND GMBH
Year of Manufacturer	1991
Owner	ROTORWING (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD
Registration No.	9M-LLF
Aircraft Serial No.	S-867
C of A Expiry Date	4 August 2027
C of R Expiry Date	28 July 2029
Engine Type	Rolls Royce 250-C20B
Engine Manufacturer	Rolls Royce Corporation
Year Manufacturer	No 1 Engine: CAE-823 351F (1989) No 2 Engine: CAE-830 316 (1976)

The helicopter was determined to be airworthy at the time of dispatch and held valid Certificates of Registration (CoR) and Airworthiness (CoA). Additional information will be included in the Final Report.

1.7 Meteorological Information

The weather assessment provided by the Malaysian Meteorological Department for 8 September 2026 indicated generally favourable weather conditions in the vicinity of Long Lellang STOLport during the period from 0000 UTC to 0900 UTC (0800 to 1700 hours local time). Radar and satellite imagery indicated no significant thunderstorm or rainfall activity within 20 NM of the STOLport from 0000 UTC to 0700 UTC. Moderate convective cloud activity was observed in the area from approximately 0800 UTC onwards.

No surface wind observations were available for Long Lellang STOLport. No aerodrome or wind shear warnings were issued for the period reviewed, and no SIGMET or AIRMET was active within 20 NM of the STOLport.

The Malaysian Meteorological Department concluded that weather conditions in the vicinity of Long Lellang STOLport were generally good, with horizontal visibility exceeding 10 km during the period assessed.

1.8 Aids to Navigation

WBGF is a VFR aerodrome and is not equipped with radio navigation or instrument landing aids. The AIP lists no VOR/DME, NDB, ILS or other radio navigation or landing aids at the aerodrome. ATC services are not available at WBGF. Flight Information Service (FIS) is available to the aircraft operating in the area through the relevant ATS units including Miri Tower and Kota Kinabalu FIS.

1.9 Communications

All communication frequencies were operating normally. No emergency call or distress transmission from the helicopter was recorded during the flight sector from departure until the accident occurred.

1.10 Aerodrome Information



(Source: Googleearth.com)

Figure 3: Long Lellang STOLport, Sarawak, Malaysia

Long Lellang STOLport is located at Long Lellang, in the Kelabit Highlands of Sarawak, Malaysia. The STOLport provides air connectivity to the surrounding remote communities and supports the transportation of passengers, supplies and essential services to the area. The STOLport is operated by Malaysia Airports Sdn. Bhd.

Airfield	Long Lellang STOLport (Runway 04/22)
Runway length	799 meters (approximately 2,621 feet) (Due to the short runway and complex highland terrain, the aerodrome exclusively supports light turboprop aircraft, most notably the De Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter).
Coordinates	03°25'17"N 115°09'12"E
Width	18 meters (approximately 59 feet)
ICAO designator/code	WBGF
IATA designator/code	LGL
Elevation	469 meters/1,538 feet
Traffic Permitted	Visual Flight Rules (VFR) only
Air Traffic Services	Not available (Flight Information Service available via Miri Tower)
Infrastructure	Consists of a single asphalt runway, an apron with a single aircraft stand (Bay 1 bearing strength supporting up to 5,670 kg), and a modest passenger terminal building.

Table 1: WBGF Aerodrome information

1.11 Flight Recorders

The helicopter was not equipped with a Flight Data Recorder (FDR) or Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). Neither recorder was required by the relevant aviation regulations.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

The main wreckage was located near the Threshold 04 area, approximately 25 metres from the edge of the runway threshold (Figure 4 and 5). The circumstances in which the helicopter contacted the ground have not yet been established.



Figure 4: Location of the helicopter came to rest



Figure 5: Drone-Generated Orthomosaic image of the accident site

Initial examination of the accident site indicated that the helicopter sustained substantial damage from fire and ground contact. The main wreckage and associated debris were located within the immediate vicinity of the accident site (Figure 6). Small items and components detached from the helicopter were identified within the accident site and were recovered for further examination and analysis.

No other damage to surrounding structures, property or objects was identified in the vicinity of the accident site.

The extent of damage to the airframe, engines, transmission system, flight controls and other helicopter components is subject to further detailed examination. All components and debris recovered from the accident site were transported to Miri for further examination and analysis (Figure 7).

A detailed wreckage examination will be conducted to establish the nature and extent of the damage and, where possible, the sequence and development of the fire and ground-contact damage. The findings of the detailed examination will be included in the Final Report.



Figure 6: Vicinity of the accident site



Figure 7 : Wreckage reconstruction in the hanger at WBGR

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

The cause of death of all occupants was determined to be severe burn injuries sustained in the accident. Further information concerning the post-mortem findings will be included in the Final Report.

1.14 Fire

A ground-based video recording of the final portion of the flight showed a visible smoke trail and apparent flames in the vicinity of the area aft of the main gearbox. After the helicopter came to rest, witnesses and responders observed the wreckage fully engulfed in fire. The origin, development and sequence of the fire remain under investigation.

1.15 Survival Aspects

When the initial responders approached the accident site, a substantial portion of the helicopter wreckage was engulfed in fire. One of the Malaysia Volunteers Corps Department (RELA) personnel who was on duty at Long Lellang STOLport (WBGF) proceeded towards the accident site carrying a portable fire extinguisher. Several local villagers subsequently proceeded to the accident site and assisted in the efforts to extinguish the fire and provide aid to the occupants. Additional personnel arrived at the accident site several minutes later and assisted with the emergency response and rescue efforts.

The rescue and firefighting function at WBGF were assigned to Aviation Security (AVSEC) RELA personnel as auxiliary rescue and firefighting personnel. There were no dedicated rescue and firefighting personnel stationed at the STOLport.

A total of twelve (12) dry powder fire extinguishers available at the STOLport terminal were deployed in an attempt to extinguish the fire, comprising five (5) units of 50 kg capacity and seven (7) units of 9 kg capacity (Figure 8). Despite the use of the available fire extinguishers, the fire could not be extinguished and continued to burn for several hours.

Photographic evidence of the initial emergency response showed that the personnel involved in the firefighting activities approached the burning wreckage and discharged portable fire extinguishers without wearing firefighting Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (Figure 9).

Firefighting PPE was available at the STOLport. Examination of the available PPE following the accident identified visible signs of deterioration and damage to some of the equipment, particularly the protective clothing (Figure 10).



Figure 8: Dry powder fire extinguishers available at Long Lellang STOLport and used during the emergency response



Figure 9: Personnel attempting to extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers




Figure 10: Firefighting protective clothing and helmet available at Long Lellang STOLport showing visible signs of deterioration and damage.

The Royal Malaysian Police (RMP), the Fire and Rescue Department of Malaysia (JBPM) and personnel from the Ministry of Health Malaysia (MOH) arrived at the accident site on the second day following the accident, using a JBPM helicopter. The AAIB investigation team arrived at the accident site on the third day following the accident, using an RMP helicopter.

The remote location of the accident site and limited road access affected the ability of additional emergency personnel to reach the site. The site is located in a rural and heavily forested area, with access by road primarily via an unpaved track used as a logging access road.

1.16 Tests and Research

An engineer from the engine manufacturer participated in the on-site investigation as a technical expert representing the State of Design and the State of Manufacture of the engine. A detailed examination of the remaining wreckage was conducted, with particular attention given to the powerplant and associated components. The powerplant components recovered from the accident site were subsequently transported to the engine manufacturer's facility for further examination and analysis. The results of the examination and analysis will be included in the Final Report.

1.17 Organisational and Management Information

1.17.1 Aircraft Operator

The helicopter was operated by Layang-Layang Aerospace Sdn. Bhd. (LLA), a Malaysian aviation operator authorised to conduct the Flying Doctor Service (FDS) operations.

The operator's organisational structure comprises management personnel responsible for flight operations, safety management, aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness. The operator has established procedures and systems governing the conduct of flight operations, aircraft maintenance, safety management and continuing airworthiness in accordance with the applicable regulatory requirements.

The operator's Flight Operations department is responsible for the planning, supervision and conduct of flight operations, including the deployment of aircraft and flight crew for FDS missions. The Safety Management function is responsible for the implementation and oversight of the operator's Safety Management System (SMS), including safety reporting, hazard identification, risk management and safety performance monitoring.

Aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness activities are managed in accordance with the operator's approved maintenance and continuing airworthiness arrangements. These activities include scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, maintenance records, defect reporting and rectification, and monitoring of the aircraft's technical status.

For the operation involved in this accident, the helicopter was deployed for a scheduled FDS flight involving the transportation of medical personnel to remote locations in Sarawak. The organisational arrangements, operational procedures, safety management processes, maintenance and continuing airworthiness activities relevant to the accident flight are being examined as part of the investigation.

At the time of preparation of this Preliminary Report, the investigation is continuing to examine the operator's organisational and management arrangements, including the adequacy and implementation of applicable operational, safety and maintenance procedures. Any findings relevant to organisational or management factors will be addressed in the Final Report.

1.17.2 Aerodrome Operator

Long Lellang STOLport (WBGF) is operated by Malaysia Airports Sdn. Bhd. (MASB). The aerodrome operator is responsible for the overall operation and management of the STOLport, including the provision and maintenance of aerodrome facilities, infrastructure and operational services in accordance with the applicable regulatory requirements.

The management and operational functions at the STOLport include the administration and supervision of aerodrome operations, maintenance of facilities and infrastructure, and coordination of emergency response activities. Personnel assigned to the

STOLport are responsible for supporting the day-to-day operation of the facility and responding to emergencies occurring within the aerodrome vicinity.

At the time of the accident, personnel were present at the STOLport. Following the accident, personnel on duty responded to the accident site and attempted to extinguish the fire using the firefighting equipment available at the STOLport. Local villagers also assisted in the initial emergency response and rescue efforts.

The investigation is examining the aerodrome's organisational and management arrangements relevant to the accident, including the availability and deployment of emergency response personnel, firefighting equipment, emergency response procedures, communication and coordination arrangements, access to the accident site, and the provision of aerodrome emergency services.

The investigation is also examining the applicable aerodrome emergency plan and the arrangements for coordinating the response between the aerodrome operator, local emergency responders and other relevant agencies. Any findings relating to organisational or management factors at the aerodrome will be addressed in the Final Report.

1.18 Additional Information

To be included in Final Report.

1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

To be included in the Final Report.

2.0 ANALYSIS

To be included in the Final Report.

3.0 CONCLUSION

3.1 Findings

The preliminary findings of the investigation are as follows:

3.1.1 Pilot

The PIC was properly licensed and qualified to conduct the flight and held a valid medical certificate.

3.1.2 Aircraft

- i) The helicopter held valid Certificates of Registration and Airworthiness and was determined to be airworthy at the time of dispatch.
- ii) A ground-based video recording showed a visible smoke trail and apparent flames in the vicinity of the area aft of the main gearbox during the final portion of the flight. The source and significance of the smoke and flames remain under investigation.
- iii) The examination of the accident helicopter's powerplant was ongoing, and any potential airworthiness implications for other engines of the same type had yet to be established.

3.1.3 Aircraft Operator

The investigation into the Aircraft Operator's operational, maintenance, continuing airworthiness and safety management arrangements relevant to the accident is ongoing.

3.1.4 Aerodrome Operator

Finding as to Risk — AVSEC RELA personnel assigned auxiliary rescue and firefighting duties responded to the fire without appropriate firefighting PPE. Some of the available PPE exhibited visible signs of deterioration and damage, which could adversely affect the safety and effectiveness of the emergency response.

3.1.5 Meteorological Condition.

The available meteorological information indicated generally favourable weather conditions in the vicinity of Long Lellang STOLport during the period relevant to the accident.

Additional findings shall be included in the Final Report.

3.2 Causes/Contributing Factors

The safety investigation is ongoing, and the factual data established thus far remain at a preliminary stage. Continuous fact-finding regarding flight operations, standard operating practices, and helicopter maintenance history will provide the necessary evidence to validate system defences and evaluate any latent conditions. A comprehensive analysis of these facts, along with the finalised findings, causes, and contributing factors, will be detailed in the Final Report.

4.0 IMMEDIATE SAFETY ACTION

4.1 Aircraft Operator

As a precautionary measure, the Aircraft Operator was recommended to suspend the operation of aircraft fitted with the same engine type pending confirmation of their airworthiness and completion of any required rectification. Subsequently, the Aircraft Operator suspended the operation of the affected aircraft.

On 13 September 2026, following its review of the submissions provided by the Aircraft Operator, CAAM advised that it had no technical objection to the return to service of the BO 105 helicopter, registration 9M-LLS, and the Nomad N22 aircraft, registration 9M-LLB, both of which were fitted with the same engine type as the accident helicopter. CAAM also emphasised that the Aircraft Operator remained responsible for ensuring their continued airworthiness and safe operation.

4.2 Aerodrome Operator

The Aerodrome Operator is recommended to review the rescue and firefighting arrangements at its STOLports to ensure that auxiliary personnel are appropriately trained and equipped, and that firefighting equipment and PPE are properly maintained and serviceable.

INVESTIGATOR IN-CHARGE

Air Accident Investigation Bureau

Ministry of Transport Malaysia