



AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

FINAL REPORT

A 06/25

Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB)

Ministry of Transport, Malaysia

**Fixed Wing Aircraft Piper PA-28-181 Archer III,
Registration HS-AMY at Pangkor Island Airport, Perak
on 30 July 2025**



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FINAL REPORT A 06/25

**AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BUREAU (AAIB)
MALAYSIA**

REPORT NO: A 06/25

OPERATOR	: PHUKET FLYING CLUB
AIRCRAFT TYPE	: PIPER PA-28-181 ARCHER III
NATIONALITY OF AIRCRAFT	: THAILAND
REGISTRATION	: HS-AMY
PLACE OF OCCURRENCE	: PANGKOR ISLAND AIRPORT, PERAK
DATE AND TIME	: 30 JULY 2025 AT 1650LT (0850 UTC)

The sole objective of the investigation is the prevention of accidents and incidents. In accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, it is not the purpose of this investigation to apportion blame or liability.

All times in this report are Local Time (LT) unless stated otherwise. LT is UTC + 8 hours.

INTRODUCTION

The Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) is the air accident and serious incident investigation authority in Malaysia and is responsible to the Minister of Transport. Its mission is to promote aviation safety through the conduct of independent and objective investigations into air accidents and serious incidents.

The AAIB conducts these investigations in accordance with Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, the Civil Aviation Act of Malaysia 1969, and the Civil Aviation Regulations of Malaysia 2016.

It is inappropriate that AAIB reports should be used to assign fault or blame or determine liability since neither the investigations nor the reporting processes have been undertaken for that purpose.

In accordance with ICAO Annex 13 paragraph 4.1, notification of the accident was sent out on 3 August 2025 to the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM), Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee (AAIC), Thailand as the State of Registration and the State of Operator, to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the United States of America as the State of Design and Manufacture. The Preliminary Report for this accident was subsequently submitted to the CAAM, AAIC and NTSB on 31 August 2025.

In accordance with ICAO Annex 13, Paragraph 6.3, a copy of the Draft Final Report was sent on 15 June 2026 to the CAAM as the State of Occurrence, the AAIC as the State of Registry, the NTSB as the State of Design and Manufacture, the Aircraft Operator, and the Aerodrome Operator, inviting their significant and substantiated comments on the report.

Unless otherwise indicated, recommendations in this report are addressed to the investigating or regulatory authorities of the State having responsibility for the matters with which the recommendations are concerned. It is for those authorities to decide what action is to be taken

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		TITLE	PAGE NO
		TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii
		LIST OF APPENDICES	v
		GLOSSARY ABBREVIATIONS	vi
		SYNOPSIS	1
1.0		FACTUAL INFORMATION	2
	1.1	History of the Flight	2
	1.2	Injuries to Persons	4
	1.3	Damage to Aircraft	4
	1.4	Other Damage	5
	1.5	Personal Information	6
	1.6	Aircraft Information	6
	1.7	Meteorological Information	7
	1.8	Aids to Navigation	8
	1.9	Communications	8
	1.10	Aerodrome Information	8
	1.11	Flight Recorders	9
	1.12	Wreckage and Impact Information	9
	1.13	Medical and Pathological Information	11
	1.14	Fire	11
	1.15	Survival Aspects	11
	1.16	Tests and Research	11
	1.17	Organisational and Management Information	12
	1.18	Additional Information	13
	1.19	Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques	15
2.0		ANALYSIS	15
3.0		CONCLUSIONS	19
	3.1	Findings	19
	3.2	Cause/Contributing Factors	20
4.0		SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS	21
	4.1	Immediate Safety Actions of Preliminary Report	21
	4.2	Safety Recommendations of this Report	23
5.0		COMMENTS TO THE REPORT AS REQUIRED BY ICAO ANNEX 13 PARAGRAPH 6.3	24

FINAL REPORT A 06/25

		CONCLUDING STATEMENT	25
		APPENDICES	

FINAL REPORT A 06/25

LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX	DESCRIPTION	PAGE NO
A	Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A)	A-1
B	Certificate of Registration (C of R)	B-1
C	Rectification Work on HS-AMY	C-1 - C-3

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A

AAIB	Air Accident Investigation Bureau
ATC	Air Traffic Controller
AFRS	Airport Fire and Rescue Service.

C

CAAM	Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia
C of A	Certificate of Airworthiness
C of R	Certificate of Registration
CPL (A)	Commercial Pilot License (Aeroplane)
CAAT	Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand

H

hrs	hours
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I

IATA	International Air Transport Association
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation

L

LT	Local Time
LH	Left Hand

M

MAHB	Malaysia Airport Holding Berhad
MASB	Malaysia Airport Sendirian Berhad
MOR	Mandatory Occurrence Reporting
m	meter
MLG	Main Landing Gear
MRO	Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul

P

PPL (A)	Private Pilot License (Aeroplane)
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FINAL REPORT A 06/25

R

RH	Right Hand
RE	Runway Excursion

S

SEP Land	Single-Engine Piston Aeroplanes.
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U

UTC	Coordinated Universal Time
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V

VTSC	Narathiwat Airport
VTSW	Phuket Airpark

W

WMPA	Pangkor Island Airport
WMKI	Ipoh Sultan Azlan Shah Airport

SYNOPSIS

On 30 July 2025, a Piper PA-28-181 Archer III, registration HS-AMY, operated by Phuket Flying Club, was conducting a private cross country flight from Narathiwat Airport (VTSC), Thailand at 0400 UTC, to Pangkor Island Airport (WMPA), Malaysia, with an intermediate stop at Ipoh Airport (WMKI).

At 0850 UTC, during landing on Runway 22 at Pangkor Island Airport, the aircraft veered right of the centreline and its right wing struck a small tree, causing structural damage. The aircraft travelled along the adjacent grassed area approximately 300 metres before re-entering the runway and taxiing to the apron via Taxiway Alpha. The occurrence resulted in no injuries to the pilot or occupants. Damage was confined to the aircraft structure.

A Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) was submitted to the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM) and the Air Accident Investigation Bureau, Malaysia (AAIB) as notification of the occurrence. The investigation team was subsequently dispatched to the occurrence site on 1 August 2025.

1.0 FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of the Flight

On 30 July 2025, a Piper PA-28-181 Archer III aircraft, registration HS-AMY, was conducting a private flight from Narathiwat Airport (VTSC), Thailand, to Pangkor Island Airport (WMPA), Malaysia, with an intermediate stop at Ipoh Airport (WMKI). The aircraft was operating together with a Sport Cruiser aircraft, registration HS-JAI. Both aircraft were operated by Phuket Flying Club, and the flight was conducted in conjunction with the aircraft's participation in Festival Udara Taiping 2.0, scheduled to be held on 1 August 2025.

HS-AMY and HS-JAI departed VTSC at approximately 0400 UTC and subsequently landed at WMKI for immigration clearance. Both aircraft later departed WMKI at approximately 0710 UTC for WMPA. Upon arrival in the vicinity of Pangkor Island, both aircraft conducted an orbit around the island to visually identify the aerodrome location, assess the runway environment, and position for landing on Runway 22.

HS-JAI landed uneventfully at WMPA at approximately 0845 UTC. Approximately five minutes later, at 0850 UTC, HS-AMY commenced its landing on Runway 22. The pilot HS-AMY reported that the approach appeared normal, stable and estimated aircraft speed approximately 75 knots during the initial approach and approximately 60 to 65 knots shortly before touchdown.

During the landing roll, the aircraft deviated to the right of the runway centreline. The skid marks evidence indicated that the aircraft initially touched down on the nose landing gear and right main landing gear, while the left main landing gear remained off the runway surface as illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Nose and RH Main Landing Gear Skid marks were observed on Runway 22

Once all landing gears were on the ground, the aircraft veered further to the right and entered the grassed area adjacent to the runway. The pilot applied left rudder input to correct the deviation however, the aircraft continued to pull to the right. The pilot then applied further left rudder input and braking to stabilise the aircraft's movement and maintain directional control. The wind was recorded as calm at the time of the accident. After the aircraft's veered off to the right side of the runway, the right wing struck a small tree near the runway edge on three (3) occasions, as illustrated in Figure 2. The impact resulted in structural damage to the RH wing leading edge.



Figure 2: The trees were struck three time by HS-AMY. The trees diameter approximately 2.0 cm to 2.5cm and height more than 100cm

The aircraft continued along the grassed area for approximately 300 metres before re-entering the runway. Three (3) tyre marks were visible in the grass area off the right side of the runway, consistent with the aircraft's ground track during the runway veered off. The aircraft subsequently taxied to the apron via Taxiway Alpha. The occurrence resulted in no injuries to the pilot or occupants. Substantial damage was confined to the RH wing structure of the aircraft.




Figure 3: The tyre marks were observed on the grassed area along a distance approximately 300 metres

1.2 Injuries to Persons

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others	Total
Fatal	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Serious	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Minor	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
None	1	1	NIL	2

There was no injuries to any of the aircraft occupants or personnel on ground

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

A general visual inspection was conducted to assess and identify any damage to the aircraft after the occurrence. No damage was found on or around the fuselage and other major components. However, significant damage was observed on the RH

wing, as shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6, with noticeable cracks and puncture damage on the leading edge area. Preliminary analysis indicates that the RH wing sustained multiple impacts with a small tree near the runway edge. Based on the initial assessment, it is apparent that the RH wing assembly has exceeded the permissible limit for aircraft structural damaged.



Figure 4: Front View – Structural condition of the
RH Wing Leading Edge



Figure 5: Side View – RH Wing Leading
Edge damage area



Figure 6: Bottom View – RH Wing
Leading Edge damage area

1.4 Other Damage

There was no reported damage to aerodrome facilities or any other property.

1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 Pilot

Status	Pilot in Command (PIC)
Nationality	Italy
Age	84 years old
Gender	Male
License Type	PPL (A)
License Validity	Valid until 18 September 2025
Aircraft Rating	SEP (Land)
Total Hours on Type From 19 March 2003	540:40 hrs
Total Flying Hours From 19 March 2003	540:40 hrs
Rest Period Since Last Flight	86:06 hrs
Date of Medical Examination	19 September 2024

At the time of the accident, the pilot possessed a valid CPL (A) license and SEP (Land) rating. He was also medically fit and adequately rested.

1.6 Aircraft Information

Aircraft Type	Piper PA-28-181 Archer III
Manufacturer	Piper Aircraft, Inc. Florida, United States
Year of Manufacture	2001
Owner	Phuket Flying Club
Registration No.	HS - AMY
Aircraft Serial No.	2843437
C of A Expiry Date	3 June 2027 (Appendix A)
C of R Expiry Date	Still Valid (Appendix B)

The aircraft was airworthy when dispatched for the flight, with a valid registration and Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A). It was maintained in compliance with regulations. Maintenance records show that the aircraft is equipped and maintained according to existing regulations and approved procedures.




Figure 7: Three views of the aircraft

The Piper PA-28-181 Archer III is a single-engine aircraft designed and manufactured by Piper Aircraft, Inc. Florida, United States. The aircraft features a low-wing design, fixed landing gear, fixed-pitch propeller and is powered by a 180-horsepower Lycoming O-360-A4M engine. A view of the Piper PA-28-181 Archer III is shown in Figure 7.

1.7 Meteorological Information

The weather at the time of the occurrence was reported to be hot and humid, consistent with typical afternoon convective conditions along the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia during July. The recorded weather conditions at WMPA are listed below:

METARWMPA300500ZVRB04KT9999FEW02133/25 Q1009RMKF05P0.0 R60 z A/R=

METARWMPA300600Z20006KT100V260 9999SCT02134/25Q1009 RMKF05 P0.0 R57 z A/R=

METARWMPA300700ZVRB03KT9999SCT02134/25Q1008RMKF05P0.0R55 z A/R=

METARWMPA300800Z20006KT110V260 9999FEW02134/24 Q1006RMK F05 P0.0 R53 z A/R=

METARWMPA300900Z21007KT150V260 9999FEW02133/25 Q1007RMK F05 P0.0 R60 z A/R=

METARWMPA301000Z21006KT150V270 9999FEW017CB32/25 Q1007RMK 1 CBEF05P0.0R63zA/R=

1.8 Aids to Navigation

All navigation aids fitted on the aircraft were serviceable at the time of the occurrence. The windsock at the aerodrome, however had been unserviceable since 5 May 2025.



Figure 8: The windsock at the aerodrome was found broken and unserviceable condition.

1.9 Communications

At the time of the incident, the aircraft was in contact with WMKI Area Control, and there was continuous two-way communication between the aircraft and ATC frequencies, which were operating normally.

1.10 Aerodrome Information

Pangkor Island Airport (IATA: PKG, ICAO: WMPA) located on the coast of the state of Perak in northwestern Peninsular Malaysia, approximately 10 km of from Marina Island Jetty Complex. The airport's coordinates are N4°14.68' / E100°33.20'. It features a single runway, Runway 04/22, with a length of approximately 732 meters, the runway width is 30 metres, and the airport elevation is 13 metres.



Figure 9: Aerial view of Pangkor Island Airport

1.11 Flight Recorders

The aircraft was not equipped with any flight data recorders.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

Figures 10 and 11 below provide a general description of the occurrence at WMPA. The aircraft veered off Runway 22, with the nose tyre mark observed on the grass approximately 16.5 meters to the right of the runway centreline.



Figure 10: HS-AMY veered to the right of Runway 22



Figure 11: General description of the accident at WMPA

Legend:

- | | | |
|---|--|---|
|  Taxiways A |  AFRS Building |  Tree No 1 |
|  Taxiways B |  Airport Terminal |  Tree No 2 |
|  Track of Aircraft |  Aircraft HS-AMY |  Tree No 3 |

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

The pilot did not undergo urine drug panel and blood alcohol screening, as there was no medical facility available at Pangkor Island to conduct such examinations. Furthermore, the AAIB received the occurrence notification only on the following day after the accident at WMPA.

1.14 Fire

There was no evidence of a fire inflight or after landing.

1.15 Survival Aspects

The aircraft came to a complete stop safely following the runway excursion sequence. The pilot and occupants were able to exit the aircraft without injury. No emergency evacuation difficulties were reported.

1.16 Tests and Research

Following the occurrence, maintenance rectification was carried out on the aircraft. The work included structural skin replacement and rib repair on the right-hand (RH) wing.

The rectification work also included reassembly of the RH and LH wings, including the associated landing gear components, as well as rigging of the flight control system on HS-AMY. Following the rectification work, an engine ground run (EGR) was carried out and found satisfactory.

The aircraft was subsequently reweighed, and the weight and balance report was revised accordingly. Upon completion of the required maintenance and inspection activities, a post-repair flight test was conducted. The flight test results were found to be satisfactory, and the aircraft was certified serviceable on 9 December 2025.

1.17 Organisational and Management Information

1.17.1 Aircraft Operator

Phuket Flying Club is a licensed flight training organisation operating from Phuket Airpark, Thailand, under the regulatory oversight of the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand (CAAT). The organisation provides flight training and related aviation services, including introductory flights, leisure flying, private pilot training, and structured programmes for students intending to pursue professional pilot careers. The club maintains a fleet of seven (7) types of light aircraft, which are used for training, recreational flying, and participation in aviation events. The organisation employs qualified instructors and experienced pilots who provide both theoretical and practical instruction in compliance with CAAT requirements.

1.17.2 Proactive Measures Taken by the Aircraft Operator

Following the occurrence involving HS-AMY at WMPA on 30 July 2025, Phuket Flying Club initiated several proactive safety measures to strengthen operational safety and reduce the likelihood of similar occurrences.

The measures included reinforcement of pilot training and awareness in the areas of crosswind landing techniques, stabilised approach criteria, runway alignment, directional control during landing roll, and timely go-around decision-making. Emphasis was also placed on ensuring that pilots recognise situations where an approach or landing should be discontinued, particularly when runway alignment cannot be maintained or when the aircraft is affected by gusting crosswind conditions.

The operator also reviewed the pilot's previous training and operating experience, including operations into the club's home airfield, VTSW. The operator stated that VTSW has an unpaved grass runway measuring approximately 18 metres in width and 500 metres in length, with no runway centreline marking. Due to these runway characteristics, maintaining accurate runway alignment and landing close to the centre of the runway are essential during operations at that airfield.

The operator further stated that the pilot had completed training flights with the club instructor and had demonstrated satisfactory capability in conducting take-offs and landings at VTSW. The pilot had also logged approximately 99 hours on HS-AMY since 2024 and had previously operated into several aerodromes.

These actions were intended to enhance pilot awareness of runway excursion risks, particularly during landing operations at WMPA with limited runway margins, obstacles and vegetation near the runway environment.

1.18 Additional Information

1.18.1 Aerodrome Environment

WMPA has a relatively short runway with limited clear areas within the vicinity of the runway strip. The presence of vegetation and small trees near the runway edge was considered relevant to the damage sustained by the aircraft following its landing on Runway 22.

At the time of the occurrence, WMPA did not have an appointed maintenance contractor to conduct routine grass cutting, vegetation control, or tree removal works. This included the management of larger trees that could potentially obstruct pilots' visual references during approach and landing.

The investigation was informed that vegetation control at WMPA was normally performed by AFRS personnel as a secondary duty. The AFRS unit consisted of four (4) personnel, whose duties included cutting grass and removing small vegetation within their capability.




Figure 12: Larger Trees and Vegetation Had Grown Higher

Where larger trees or vegetation were identified and considered beyond the capability of the AFRS personnel, the condition would be reported to MASB Ipoh Aerodrome for further coordination and action.

1.18.2 Crew HS-JAI

During the witness interview, the HS-JAI crew informed the investigation team that their approach and landing at WMPA were normal and stable, with no significant crosswind, gusting wind, or abnormal wind condition experienced. The crew also stated that the wind conditions at the time were not considered to be beyond the aircraft's performance or operating limitations.

After landing, the HS-JAI crew observed HS-AMY on approach and stated that the approach did not appear to be stable. According to the crew, HS-AMY appeared to land displaced from the runway centreline and drifted towards the right side of the runway during the flare and landing roll, resulting in the right wing contacting small trees near the runway edge.

The witness further stated that the aircraft's misalignment with the runway centreline was unexpected and that a go-around should have been initiated if the approach was unstable or if the aircraft was not properly aligned with the runway centreline.

1.18.3 Aircraft Repair and Rectification

Following the occurrence, the aircraft underwent rectification work involving the aircraft wing structure, flight control rigging, inspection, and certification. Details of the rectification process carried out on aircraft HS-AMY are provided in **Appendix C**. Following completion of the required maintenance and certification activities, HS-AMY was declared serviceable on 9 December 2025.

Based on the available information, there was no evidence to indicate that a pre-occurrence aircraft system malfunction, flight control defect or engine-related anomaly contributed to the accident.

1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

The investigation relied on physical evidence from the occurrence site, including tyre marks, ground track evidence, photographs of the aircraft damage, operator-provided information, maintenance/repair documentation, and witness or pilot statements where available. The absence of flight recorders required the investigation to rely on site evidence, photographic evidence, aircraft damage assessment, and statements to reconstruct the occurrence sequence.

2.0 ANALYSIS

The investigation focused on operational and human factors as the key elements to the occurrence involving HS-AMY which happened on 30 July 2025. The approach was assessed as unstable during the final stage of landing, as the aircraft was not maintained on the runway centerline and continued to drift towards the right side of the runway.

2.1 Pilot Familiarity With WMPA

The pilot's limited familiarity with WMPA was considered relevant to the occurrence. The aircraft operator stated that the pilot had previous experience operating HS-AMY, having logged approximately 120 hours on the aircraft since 2024, and had demonstrated satisfactory handling capability during those operations. However, WMPA presented a different runway environment, characterized by a relatively short paved runway and vegetation located in close proximity to the runway edge. The decision to conduct only one circuit, instead of the pilot's normal multi-circuit practice, reduced the opportunity to fully assess the runway environment and establish suitable visual references for landing.

2.2 Unstabilised approach

The aircraft's approach and landing were assessed as unstable during the final stage of landing. Following touchdown, the aircraft deviated to the right of the runway centreline and subsequently entered the grassed area adjacent to the runway.

This indicates that the aircraft was not adequately aligned with the runway at touchdown and that directional control was not effectively maintained during the landing roll.

The continuation of the landing from an unstable condition was considered to have contributed to the runway veer-off and subsequent impact of the right wing with vegetation near the runway edge.

2.3 HS-AMY Flight Path

The Evidence indicates that the aircraft was not maintained on or near the runway centerline during the final stage of approach, flare, and touchdown. The crew of a preceding aircraft, who had landed earlier and observed the arrival, stated that the arriving aircraft HS-AMY appeared unstable on approach and displaced from the centerline. They further noted that, HS-AMY drifted toward the right side of the runway during the flare and landing roll.

This observation was consistent with physical evidence found at the occurrence site. Initial ground marks indicated contact by the nose wheel and right main gear on the runway surface, with no corresponding left main gear mark in the initial touchdown area.

2.4 Runway Alignment

Based on witness statements and subsequent flight data, the investigation concluded that the aircraft was not adequately aligned with the runway centerline during the final stage of landing. Maintaining position relative to the runway centerline is critical during landing, particularly at aerodromes with short runways and limited runway safety areas. Any deviation from the centerline during the final approach reduces the lateral margin available for corrections during the flare and touchdown.

2.5 Rightward Drift During Landing

During the final stage of landing, the aircraft was observed drifting toward the right side of the runway during the flare and landing roll. Environmental data indicated that no significant crosswinds, wind gusts, or abnormal weather conditions were present at the time of landing. Consequently, the rightward drift was likely associated with aircraft alignment, control inputs, and directional control during the final landing phase. This sustained drift reduced the aircraft's lateral clearance from the runway edge, increasing the probability of a runway excursion after touchdown.

2.7 Loss of Directional Control

Following touchdown, the aircraft continued to deviate towards the right side of the runway. The pilot reportedly applied corrective inputs, including left rudder and braking, however, the aircraft continued sideways movement to grassed area adjacent to the runway. Once the aircraft departed the paved runway surface, directional control would have been more difficult to maintain due to the change in surface condition and reduced effectiveness of normal ground control inputs.

The aircraft ground track and damage pattern were consistent with a runway veered off to the right following a loss or reduction of directional control during the landing roll.

2.5 Human Factors Analysis

The Human Factors Analysis framework was utilized to identify potential human performance factors that may have contributed to the occurrence. The analysis focused primarily on crew operational decision-making and pilot performance.

2.5.1 Complacency

The pilot had prior experience operating the aircraft type, accumulating approximately 120 hours on type. This familiarity and experience may have contributed to an expectation that the landing could be completed safely after only one circuit. Consequently, this expectation may have reduced the pilot's sensitivity to the threats associated with an unfamiliar runway environment.

2.5.2 Lack of Awareness

The pilot's decision to conduct only a single circuit prior to landing reduced the opportunity to fully assess the runway environment, specifically runway alignment cues, obstacle proximity, wind conditions, and available lateral clearance. Because the aircraft subsequently deviated from the runway centerline during the flare and landing roll, the evidence suggests that situational awareness regarding runway alignment and aircraft positioning was not fully maintained during the final stage of landing.

2.5.3 Norms

The pilot stated that their normal practice when operating into an unfamiliar aerodrome was to conduct two or three circuits or go-arounds to become familiar with the runway layout, visual references, and approach profile prior to landing.

However, during the occurrence flight, only a single circuit was conducted before the pilot proceeded to land. This deviation from normal practice likely reduced the opportunity to thoroughly assess the local runway environment and establish adequate visual references.

3.0 CONCLUSION

3.1 Findings

The findings of the investigation are as follows:

3.1.1 Pilot

- i) The pilot was qualified and approved to perform the flight in accordance with existing regulations.
- ii) The pilot was medically fit and adequately rested to operate the flight.
- iii) Toxicology screening for substance abuse and blood alcohol content analyses was not conducted.

3.1.2 Aircraft

- i) The aircraft was airworthy when cleared for the flight.
- ii) The aircraft has a valid Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) and has been maintained in compliance with regulations.
- iii) Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact mechanical or electrical malfunctions.

3.1.3 Aircraft Operator

The aircraft operator has taken proactive measures by reaching out to the MRO for assistance in providing further repair recommendations, and the crew has discussed preventive actions internally to mitigate such incidents in the future.

3.1.4 Aerodrome Operator

- i) Excessive vegetation growth, including tall grass and small trees near the runway edges, was observed within the aerodrome area. This condition could obstruct visibility, create hazards to aircraft operations, and compromise safe operating conditions.
- ii) The lack of a serviceable windsock at the aerodrome represented a safety deficiency; however, its unserviceability was determined not to be a primary contributing factor to the occurrence.

3.2 Cause/Contributing Factors

3.2.1 Cause

The accident was caused by the aircraft's lateral deviation from the runway centerline during landing, which resulted in the aircraft veered off to the right side of Runway 22 and subsequently contacted vegetation near the runway edge. The accident is categorised as a **Runway Excursion (RE)**.

3.2.2 Contributing Factors

The contributing factors to this occurrence reflect a combination of human performance limitations and systemic deficiencies, which collectively reduced the available safety margins.

i) Continuation of an Unstable Approach

The aircraft was not properly aligned with the runway centerline during the final approach. Witness accounts and ground evidence show the aircraft drifted to the right. Continuing the landing instead of initiating a go-around resulted in an unstable touchdown and subsequent runway veer off.

ii) **Ineffective Go-Around Decision**

A go-around should have been initiated when the aircraft became unstable or when runway alignment could not be maintained. The decision to continue the landing compromised the safety margins for the flight crew and passengers.

iii) **Vegetation Near the Runway Edge**

Vegetation and small trees near the runway edge contributed to the substantial damage sustained by the RH wing of HS-AMY.

4.0 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

4.1 Immediate Safety Actions of Preliminary Report

4.1.1 The Preliminary Report for this accident, issued on 30 August 2025, contained the following recommendation for immediate safety action to pilots:

Encouraging Reporting: Pilots should be encouraged to report any abnormalities or concerns regarding aircraft systems. This proactive communication enables timely troubleshooting and intervention by maintenance teams, ensuring that issues are addressed promptly and minimizing risks to aircraft airworthiness.

Maintaining Situational Awareness: Pilots must maintain a high level of situational awareness during all flight phases, particularly concerning aircraft systems and performance. Vigilance in monitoring cockpit instrumentation and responding promptly to anomalies is crucial for safe and efficient flight operations.

Based on these recommendations, the operator instructed pilots to remain vigilant, adhere to company procedures and relevant documentation, stay alert to abnormalities, communicate promptly, follow prescribed procedures, and prioritise safety to prevent accidents and incidents.

4.1.2 The Preliminary Report for this accident, issued on 30 August 2025, contained the following recommendation for immediate safety action to the Aircraft Operator:

Fostering a Culture of Improvement: *The organisation should foster a culture of continual improvement by encouraging pilots and maintenance personnel to actively participate in identifying areas for enhancement related to aircraft systems and operational procedures.*

Phuket Flying Club acknowledges the recommendation and will continue to promote continual improvement by encouraging all personnel to report safety concerns and identify areas for procedural improvement. Feedback received will be reviewed through the Club's internal safety process to enhance safety and prevent similar occurrences.

4.1.3 The Preliminary Report for this accident, issued on 30 August 2025, contained the following recommendations for immediate safety action to the Aerodrome Operator:

Safe Obstacle-Free Zones.: *Establish a regular vegetation control programme, to clear grass and remove small trees within the aerodrome area, particularly near the runway edges, in order to ensure safe operating conditions.*

Windsock: *The Aerodrome Operator of Pangkor Island Airport shall ensure the installation and proper maintenance of a serviceable windsock in accordance with ICAO Annex 14 Volume I – Aerodrome Design and Operations and CAD 14 Volume I – Aerodrome Design and Operations, Chapter 5 – Visual Aids for navigation, 5.1.1.1 stated an aerodrome shall be equipped with at least one wind direction indicator.*

In line with the proposed immediate safety actions, no feedback has been received from the Aerodrome Operator regarding both matters. Therefore, the proposed safety action remains in effect.

4.2 Safety Recommendations of this Report

The Safety Recommendations to the respective organisations to address the safety concerns identified in this investigation are as follows:

4.2.1 Aircraft Operator

i) It is recommended that the Phuket Flying Club review and enhance its ground and flight training curricula to integrate formalized Threat and Error Management (TEM) scenarios, specifically emphasizing stabilized approach criteria, positive directional control variables during crosswind touchdowns, and mandatory go-around execution protocols when runway alignment is compromised.

(AAIB Recommendation: SR A06/25-1)

ii) It is recommended that the Phuket Flying Club establish standardized operational risk assessment checklists for private cross-country flights targeting unfamiliar aerodromes, explicitly mandating comprehensive pre-flight aerodrome briefings and instructor-led route reviews.

(AAIB Recommendation: SR A06/25-2)

4.2.2 Aerodrome Operator

i) It is recommended that the Aerodrome Operator review and restructure its vegetation management and obstacle removal framework at Pangkor Island Airport (WMPA) to implement a formalized, scheduled trimming program, ensuring the Runway Strip and Obstacle-Free Zones are strictly maintained in accordance with CAD 14 regulatory standards

(AAIB Recommendation: SR A06/25-3)

ii) It is recommended that the Aerodrome Operator execute a comprehensive safety risk assessment for flight operations at WMPA to identify physical hazards, evaluate lateral clearance restrictions near runway edges, and establish permanent mitigation protocols

(AAIB Recommendation: SR A06/25-4)

iii) It is recommended that the Aerodrome Operator establish a rigorous maintenance tracking log to ensure that critical visual aids for navigation, specifically aerodrome windsocks are subjected to routine serviceability inspections and replaced promptly upon failure.

(AAIB Recommendation: SR A06/25-5)

4.2.3 CAAM

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM), in its capacity as the regulatory oversight body, conduct a formal safety and obstacle assessment at Pangkor Island Airport (WMPA) to validate the aerodrome's compliance with structural safety margins, and mandate immediate corrective actions regarding natural growth incursions along the runway edges.

(AAIB Recommendation: SR A06/25-6)

5.0 COMMENTS TO THE REPORT AS REQUIRED BY ICAO ANNEX 13, PARAGRAPH 6.3

In accordance with ICAO Annex 13, Paragraph 6.3, a copy of the Draft Final Report was sent on 15 June 2026 to the CAAM as the State of Occurrence, the AAIC as the State of Registry, the NTSB as the State of Design and Manufacture, the Aircraft Operator, and the Aerodrome Operator, inviting their significant and substantiated comments on the report. The following are the status of the comments received:

No	States/Organisations	Status of Significant and Substantiated Comments
1.	Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM)	Report accepted and no comments.
2.	Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee (AAIC), Thailand	Paragraph 1.10 – Comments accepted and amended accordingly
3.	National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the United States of America	Figure 11 – Comments accepted and amended accordingly

FINAL REPORT A 06/25

No	States/Organisations	Status of Significant and Substantiated Comments
4.	Malaysia Airport Sendirian Berhad (MASB)	Report received and no comments.
5	Phuket Flying Club, Thailand	Report received and no comments.

Status of Significant and Substantiated Comments

CONCLUDING STATEMENT

This report presents the findings of the investigation into the serious incident involving Piper PA-28-181 Archer III registration HS-AMY, with a primary focus on identifying safety factors and areas for improvement. It is emphasized that these findings and recommendations are not intended to assign blame or liability to any individual or organisation but to enhance safety and prevent recurrence. By addressing the identified issues and implementing the proposed recommendations, stakeholders can strengthen operational safety, improve system reliability, and uphold the highest standards of aviation safety

Investigator-in-charge
Air Accident Investigation Bureau
Ministry of Transport Malaysia

AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATE OF AIRWORTHINESS

 ประเทศไทย THAILAND สำนักงานการบินพลเรือนแห่งประเทศไทย THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THAILAND ใบสำคัญสมรรถนะเดินอากาศแบบมาตรฐาน STANDARD AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATE			เลขที่ 670139 NO.
1. เครื่องหมายสัญชาติและทะเบียน NATIONALITY AND REGISTRATION MARKS HS-AMY	2. ผู้สร้างและชื่อแบบอากาศยานตั้งโดยผู้สร้าง MANUFACTURER AND MANUFACTURER'S DESIGNATION OF AIRCRAFT PIPER AIRCRAFT, INC. PA-28-181	3. หมายเลขชุดของอากาศยาน AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 2843437	
4. ประเภท CATEGORIES NORMAL			
5. ใบสำคัญสมรรถนะเดินอากาศฉบับนี้ออกให้ตามอนุสัญญาว่าด้วยการบินพลเรือนระหว่างประเทศ ลงวันที่ ๗ ธันวาคม พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๗ และตามพระราชบัญญัติการเดินอากาศ พ.ศ. ๒๔๙๗ สำหรับใช้กับอากาศยานที่กล่าวข้างต้น ซึ่งถือว่าสมรรถนะเดินอากาศเมื่อบำรุงรักษาและใช้งานตามอนุสัญญา กับพระราชบัญญัติดังกล่าวแล้ว และตามข้อกำหนดที่ได้ออกไว้สำหรับอากาศยานแบบนี้โดยเฉพาะ THIS CERTIFICATE OF AIRWORTHINESS IS ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION DATED 7 DECEMBER, 1944 AND THE AIR NAVIGATION ACT, B.E. 2497, IN RESPECT OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED AIRCRAFT WHICH IS CONSIDERED TO BE AIRWORTHY WHEN MAINTAINED AND OPERATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING CONVENTION AND ACT AND THE APPLICABLE AIRCRAFT OPERATING LIMITATIONS.			
วันที่ออกให้ DATE OF ISSUE	วันที่หมดอายุ DATE OF EXPIRY	พนักงานเจ้าหน้าที่ COMPETENT OFFICIAL	
หมายเหตุ REMARKS			

FORM : AIR/AW-001

AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY

 ประเทศไทย THAILAND สำนักงานการบินพลเรือนแห่งประเทศไทย THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THAILAND ใบสำคัญการจดทะเบียน CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION			เลขที่ 670054 NO.
1. เครื่องหมายสัญชาติและทะเบียน NATIONALITY AND REGISTRATION MARKS HS-AMY	2. ผู้สร้างและชื่อแบบอากาศยานตั้งโดยผู้สร้าง MANUFACTURER AND MANUFACTURER'S DESIGNATION OF AIRCRAFT PIPER AIRCRAFT, INC. PA-28-181	3. หมายเลขชุดของอากาศยาน AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER 2843437	
4. ชื่อเจ้าของ NAME OF OWNER PHINYADA PHITHANSIRI	5. ที่อยู่เจ้าของ ADDRESS OF OWNER 9 MUEN-NGERN RD, PATONG, KATHU, PHUKET, 83150, THAILAND		
6. ใบสำคัญการจดทะเบียนฉบับนี้ให้ไว้เพื่อแสดงว่า อากาศยานที่กล่าวแล้วข้างบนนี้ ได้จดทะเบียนในประเทศไทยแล้ว ตามอนุสัญญาการบินพลเรือนระหว่างประเทศ ลงวันที่ ๗ ธันวาคม พุทธศักราช ๒๔๘๗ และตามพระราชบัญญัติการเดินอากาศ พุทธศักราช ๒๔๙๗ IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN DULY ENTERED ON THE REGISTER OF THAILAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION DATED 7 DECEMBER, 1944 AND WITH THE AIR NAVIGATION ACT B.E. 2497.			
วันที่ออกให้ DATE OF ISSUE	23 APRIL 2024	พนักงานเจ้าหน้าที่ COMPETENT OFFICIAL (SARUN BENJANIRAT) DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ACTING DIRECTOR GENERAL	
หมายเหตุ REMARKS	24-BIT AIRCRAFT ADDRESS BINARY: 100010000000010110111001 HEXADECIMAL: 880589		

ใบสำคัญการจดทะเบียนฉบับนี้มิใช่หลักฐานยืนยันการเป็นเจ้าของอากาศยานตามกฎหมาย (THE CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION IS NOT PROOF OF LEGAL OWNERSHIP.)

FORM : AIR/AR-001

RECTIFICATION WORK ON HS-AMY

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	JOB COMPLETED
(A)	Aircraft Disassembled to Facilitate Transport to the Maintenance Facility	
1.	Defuel LH and RH tan	10 Sept 2025
2.	Remove LH and RH wing assembly.	
3.	Remove nose landing gear assembly and repack	
4.	Remove propeller assembly and repack	
(B)	RH Wing Skin, Rib and Aileron Removal	
1.	Prepare RH wing assembly on cradle.	14 Nov 2025
2.	Remove damaged forward skin (PN 35118-047) from the wing	19 Nov 2025
3.	Remove damaged forward skin (PN 35118-029) from the wing	
4.	Remove damaged stall strip from the wing	20 Nov 2025
5.	Remove damaged rib STA. 174 (PN 35166-001) from the	
6.	Remove damaged aileron assembly from the wing.	
(C)	New Skins, Rib and Aileron Installation	
1.	Clean and inspect on work areas	21 Nov 2025
2.	Install new rib STA. 174 (PN 35166-001) to the win	
3.	Install new forward skin (PN 35118-047) to the wing	25 Nov 2025
4.	Install new forward skin (PN 35118-029) to the wing.	27 Nov 2025
5.	Install new stall strip kit (PN 765-399) to the wing.	
6.	Install new aileron (PN 35640-001) to the wing	
(D)	RH Fuel tank replacement	
1.	Remove tank assembly screws	28 Nov 2025
2.	Remove access panel at WS 54.00 and disconnect fuel line attached to tank	
3.	Pull tank from wing assembly enough to remove sender wire	
4.	Remove tank	
5.	Prepare new tank (PN 35633-003) for installation.	
6.	Slide tank (PN 35633-003) into position and attach fuel line	
7.	Connect sender wire.	
8.	Install and tighten screws around fuel tank	
(E)	Aircraft Assemble	
1.	Check fuselage is positioned solidly on support cradle	1 Dec 2025
2.	Prepare LH and RH wing for installation	
3.	Prepare all lines, cables for inserting into the wing	
4.	Slide wing into position on fuselage	2 Dec 2025
5.	Install bolts with washers and nuts attaching front spar with fuselage fitting	

FINAL REPORT A 06/25

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	JOB COMPLETED
6.	Install bolts with washers and nuts attaching rear spar with fuselage fitting	2 Dec 2025
7.	Tighten the eighteen main spar bolt nuts or boltheads to torque of 360 to 390 inch-pounds	
8.	Tighten forward spar attachment bolt to a torque of 50 to 60 inch-pounds.	
9.	Install wing jacks and tail support to tail skid	
10.	Remove fuselage cradle and wing supports	
11.	Connect pitot tube and other electrical leads. Secure fittings	3 Dec 2025
12.	Connect hydraulic lines, fuel lines. Secure fittings and clamps	
13.	Connect aileron balance and control cables at turnbuckles in fuselage aft of spar	
14.	Connect flap by placing flap handle in full flap position, place bushing on outside of rod end bearing and insert and tighten bolt	4 Dec 2025
15.	Check rigging and control cable tension of ailerons and flaps	
16.	Service and refill brake system	
17.	Refuel and check for fuel leaking	
18.	Check Operation of all electrical equipment and pitot system.	
19.	Remove airplane form jacks.	5 Dec 2025
20.	Install cockpit trim panel assembly, spar box carpet, front and back seats and wiring butt rubber moulding.	
21.	Install all access panels and plates on the wing involved	
(F)	Propeller Installation	
1.	Turn magneto switch to OFF	5 Dec 2025
2.	Place alternator drive belt in groove of starter ring gear and nng gear and position starter gear on flange of crankshaft. Verify stamped "O" o gear is aligned with 'O" on crankshaft flange.	
3.	Install propeller spinner back plate or bulkhead on starter ring gear	
4.	Rotate crankshaft until top centre (TC) mark on starter gear and crankcase parting flange are aligned.	
5.	Install propeller with tips pointing at two and eight o' clock position	
6.	Install and tighten each propeller bolt with washer, with finger tight. Use a torque wrench for final tightening and tighten in sequence. Tighten one-half inch bolts to a torque of 720 to 780 inch pounds	
7.	Check propeller blade track	
8.	Secure propeller mounting bolts with safety wire	

FINAL REPORT A 06/25

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	JOB COMPLETED
9.	Install spinner and tighten cap bolts to a torque of 35-to-40-inch pounds	5 Dec 2025
10.	Inspect alternator belt tension as necessary.	
		9 Dec 2025
(G)	Return to Service	
1.	Perform engine ground run	
2.	Check fuel pump and fuel tank selector operability.	
3.	Check fuel quantity, pressure and flow readings.	
4.	Check oil pressure and temperature	
5.	Check alternator output	
6.	Check manifold pressure	
7.	Check carburetor air	
8.	Check parking brake operability.	
9.	Check auxiliary vacuum pump operability.	
10.	Check vacuum gauge	
11.	Check gyros for noise and roughness	
12.	Check cabin heater operability.	
13.	Check magneto switch operability.	
14.	Check magneto RPM variation.	
15.	Check throttle and mixture operability.	
16.	Check propeller smoothness	
17.	Perform maximum power static RMP check	
18.	Check engine idle	
19.	Check electronic equipment operability	
20.	Check autopilot, automatic or manual pitch trim if installed	