

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PRELIMINARY REPORT A 06/25

Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) Ministry of Transport, Malaysia

Fixed Wing Aircraft Piper PA-28-181 Archer III,

Registration HS-AMY at Pangkor Island Airport,

Perak, Malaysia

on 30 July 2025



Air Accident Investigation Bureau Ministry of Transport No.26, Jalan Tun Hussein, Precinct 4 Federal Government Administrative Centre 62100 PUTRAJAYA

Phone: +603-8892 8080

Fax: +603-8888 0163

E-mail: <u>AAIB@mot.gov.my</u>

Website: <u>http://www.mot.gov.my/en</u>

Issued on 30 August 2025 MOT (S)600-5/4/105

AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BUREAU (AAIB) MALAYSIA

REPORT NO: A 06/25

OPERATOR : PHUKET FLYING CLUB

AIRCRAFT TYPE : PIPER PA-28-181 ARCHER III

NATIONALITY OF AIRCRAFT : THAILAND

REGISTRATION : HS-AMY

PLACE OF OCCURRENCE: PANGKOR ISLAND AIRPORT,

PERAK

DATE AND TIME : 30 JULY 2025 AT 1650LT (0850 UTC)

This preliminary report contains statements of facts which have been determined up to the time of issue. It must be regarded as tentative, and is subjected to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available.

This investigation is carried out to determine the circumstances and causes of the accident with a view to the preservation of life and the avoidance of accident or incident in the future. It is not the purpose of this investigation to apportion blame or liability (Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention and Civil Aviation Regulations 2016)

INTRODUCTION

The Air Accident Investigation Bureau of Malaysia

The Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) is the air accident investigation authority in Malaysia and is responsible to the Minister of Transport. Its mission is to promote aviation safety through the conduct of independent and objective investigations into air accidents and serious incidents.

The AAIB also conducts investigation into incidents when the occurrence shows evidence to have safety concerns.

The AAIB conducts investigations in accordance with the Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention and Civil Aviation Regulations of Malaysia 2016. The AAIB adheres to the International Civil Aviation Organisation's (ICAO's) stated objective, which is as follows:

"The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the prevention of accident and incident. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability".

Accordingly, it is inappropriate that AAIB report should be used to assign fault or blame or determine liability, since neither the investigation nor the reporting process has been undertaken for that purpose

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		TITLE	PAGE NO
			140
		TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii
		GLOSSARY ABBREVIATIONS	iv
		SYNOPSIS	1
1.0		FACTUAL INFORMATION	2
	1.1	History of the Flight	2
	1.2	Injuries to Persons	4
	1.3	Damage to Aircraft	4
	1.4	Other Damage	5
	1.5	Personal Information	5
	1.6	Aircraft Information	6
	1.7	Meteorological Information	7
	1.8	Aids to Navigation	7
	1.9	Communications	7
	1.10	Aerodrome Information	8
	1.11	Flight Recorders	8
	1.12	Wreckage and Impact Information	8
	1.13	Medical and Pathological Information	10
	1.14	Fire	10
	1.15	Survival Aspects	10
	1.16	Tests and Research	10
	1.17	Organisational and Management Information	10
	1.18	Additional Information	11
	1.19	Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques	11
2.0		ANALYSIS	11
3.0		CONCLUSIONS	11
	3.1	Findings	11
	3.2	Probable Cause	12
_			
4.0		IMMEDIATE SAFETY ACTIONS	12
		APPENDICES	

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

Α

AAIB Air Accident Investigation Bureau

ATC Air Traffic Controller

C

CAAM Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia

C of A Certificate of Airworthiness
C of R Certificate of Registration

CPL (A) Commercial Pilot License (Aeroplane)
CAAT Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand

Н

hrs hours

I

IATA International Air Transport Association
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation

L

LT Local Time
LH Left Hand

M

MAHB Malaysia Airport Holding Berhad
MASB Malaysia Airport Sendirian Berhad
MOR Mandatory Occurrence Reporting

m meter

Ρ

PPL (A) Private Pilot License (Aeroplane)

R

RH Right Hand

S

SEP Land Single-Engine Piston Aeroplanes.

U

UTC Coordinated Universal Time

٧

VTSC Narathiwat Airport

W

WMPA Pangkor Island Airport

WMKI Ipoh Sultan Azlan Shah Airport

SYNOPSIS

On 30 July 2025, a Piper PA-28-181 Archer III, registration HS-AMY, operated by Phuket Flying Club, was conducting a private flight from Narathiwat Airport (VTSC), Thailand at 0400 UTC, to Pangkor Island Airport (WMPA), Malaysia, with an intermediate stop at Ipoh Airport (WMKI).

At 0850 UTC, during landing on Runway 22 at Pangkor Island Airport, the aircraft veered right of the centreline and its right wing struck a small tree, causing structural damage. The aircraft travelled along the adjacent grassed area approximately 300 metres before re-entering the runway and taxiing to the apron via Taxiway Alpha. The occurrence resulted in no injuries to the pilot or occupants. Damage was confined to the aircraft structure.

A Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) was submitted to the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM) and the Air Accident Investigation Bureau, Malaysia (AAIB) to notify them of the incident.

1.0 FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of the Flight

On 30 July 2025, a Piper PA-28-181 Archer III aircraft, registration HS-AMY, was conducting a private flight together with a SportCruiser aircraft, registration HS-JAI, from Narathiwat Airport (VTSC), Thailand, departing at 0400 UTC, to Pangkor Island Airport (WMPA), Malaysia, with an intermediate stop at Ipoh Airport (WMKI). Both flights were operated by Phuket Flying Club and were conducted in conjunction with the participation of the aircraft in Festival Udara Taiping 2.0, scheduled for 1 August 2025.

Both aircraft departed WMKI at approximately 0710 UTC for Pangkor Island. Upon arrival, they performed an orbit around the island to visually identify the aerodrome location and prepare for landing on Runway 22. The aircraft HS-JAI landed uneventfully at 0845 UTC. Approximately five minutes later, at 0850 UTC, HS-AMY commenced landing on Runway 22

During the landing roll, the aircraft deviated to the right of the runway centreline. Tyre mark evidence indicated that the aircraft initially touched down on the nose landing gear and right main landing gear, while the left main landing gear remained off the runway surface.




Figure 1: Nose and RH Main Landing Gear tyre marks were observed on Runway 22

Once all landing gears were on the ground, the aircraft veered further to the right and entered the grassed area adjacent to the runway. The right wing struck a small tree three (3) times near the runway edge, resulting in structural damage to the RH wing leading edge.



Figure 2: The trees were struck three time by HS-AMY. The trees diameter approximately 2.0 cm to 2.5cm and height more than 100cm

The aircraft continued along the grassed area for approximately 300 metres before regaining the runway and subsequently taxied to the apron via Taxiway Alpha. The occurrence resulted in no injuries to the pilot or occupants. Damage was confined to the RH wing structure of the aircraft.



Figure 3: The tyre marks were observed on the grasses area along a distance approximately 300 metres

1.2 Injuries to Persons

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others	Total
Fatal	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Serious	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Minor	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
None	1	1	NIL	2

There was no injury to any of the aircraft occupant or personnel on ground

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

A general visual inspection was conducted to assess and identify any damage to the aircraft after the occurrence. No damage was found on or around the fuselage and other major components. However, significant damage was observed on the RH wing, as shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6, with noticeable cracks and puncture damage on the leading-edge area. Preliminary analysis indicates that the RH wing sustained multiple impacts with a small tree near the runway edge. Based on the initial assessment, it is apparent that the RH wing assembly has exceeded the permissible limit for aircraft structure damaged.



Figure 4: Front View – Structural condition of the RH Wing Leading Edge






Figure 5: Side View – RH Wing Leading Edge damage area

Figure 6: Bottom View – RH Wing Leading Edge damage area

Detailed damage examination report on the aircraft will be included in the Final Report

1.4 Other Damage

There was no reported damage to aerodrome facilities or any other property.

1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 Pilot

Status	Pilot in Command (PIC)	
Nationality	Italy	
Age	84 years old	
Gender	Male	
License Type	PPL (A)	
License Validity	Valid until 18 September 2025	
Aircraft Rating	SEP (Land)	
Total Hours on Type From 19 March 2003	540:40 hrs	
Total Flying Hours From 19 March 2003	540:40 hrs	
Rest Period Since Last Flight	86:06 hrs	
Date of Medical Examination	19 September 2024	

At the time of the accident, the pilot possessed a valid CPL (A) license and SEP (Land) rating. He was also medically fit and adequately rested.

1.6 Aircraft Information

Aircraft Type	Piper PA-28-181 Archer III	
Manufacturer	Piper Aircraft, Inc. Florida, United States	
Year of Manufacturer	2001	
Owner	Phuket Flying Club	
Registration No.	HS - AMY	
Aircraft Serial No.	2843437	
C of A Expiry Date	3 June 2027	
C of R Expiry Date	Still Valid	

The aircraft was airworthy when dispatched for the flight, with a valid registration and Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A). It was maintained in compliance with regulations. Maintenance records show that the aircraft is equipped and maintained according to existing regulations and approved procedures.

The Piper PA-28-181 Archer III is a single-engine aircraft designed and manufactured by Piper Aircraft, Inc. Florida, United States. The aircraft features a low-wing design, fixed landing gear, fixed-pitch propeller and is powered by a 180-horsepower Lycoming O-360-A4M engine.




Figure 7: Three views of the aircraft

1.7 Meteorological Information

The weather at the time of the occurrence was hot, humid, and consistent with afternoon convective conditions typical of the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia in July. Additional meteorological information will be included in the Final Report.

1.8 Aids to Navigation

All navigation aids fitted on the aircraft were serviceable at the time of the occurrence. The windsock at the aerodrome, however had been unserviceable since 5 May 2025.




Figure 8: The windsock at the aerodrome was found broken and unserviceable condition.

1.9 Communications

At the time of the incident, the aircraft was in contact with WMKI Area Control, and there was continuous two-way communication between the aircraft and ATC frequencies, which were operating normally.

1.10 Aerodrome Information

Pangkor Island Airport (IATA: PKG, ICAO: WMPA) located on the coast of the state of Perak in northwestern Peninsular Malaysia, approximately 10 km of from Marina Island Jetty Complex. The airport's coordinates are N4°14.68' / E100°33.20'. It features a single runway, Runway 04/22, with a length of approximately 732 meters and an elevation of about 30 metres.



Figure 9: Aerial view of Pangkor Island Airport

1.11 Flight Recorders

The aircraft was not equipped with any flight data recorders.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

Figure 10 below provides a general description of Pangkor Island Airport. The aircraft veered off Runway 22, with the nose tyre mark observed on the grass approximately 16.5 meters to the right of the runway centreline.




Figure 10: General description of the accident at Pangkor Island Airport



Figure 10: HS-AMY veered to the right of Runway 22

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

The pilot did not undergo urine drug panel and blood alcohol screening, as there was no medical facility available at Pangkor Island to conduct such examinations. Furthermore, the Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) received the occurrence notification only on the following day after the accident at Pangkor Island Airport.

1.14 Fire

There was no evidence of a fire inflight or after landing.

1.15 Survival Aspects

Not applicable.

1.16 Tests and Research

To be included in the Final Report.

1.17 Organisational and Management Information

1.17.1 Aircraft Operator

Phuket Flying Club is a licensed flight training organisation operating from Phuket Airpark, Thailand, under the regulatory oversight of the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand (CAAT). The organisation provides flight training and related aviation services, including introductory flights, leisure flying, private pilot training, and structured programmes for students intending to pursue professional pilot careers. The club maintains a fleet of seven (7) types of light aircraft, which are used for training, recreational flying, and participation in aviation events. The organisation employs qualified instructors and experienced pilots who provide both theoretical and practical instruction in compliance with CAAT requirements.

1.17.2 Proactive Measures Taken by the Aircraft Operator

Following the occurrence involving aircraft HS-AMY at Pangkor Island Airport on 30 July 2025, Phuket Flying Club undertook a series of proactive measures to strengthen operational safety. These actions included enhancing pilot training on crosswind handling, stabilised approaches, and go-around decision-making.

1.18 Additional Information

To be included in the Final Report.

1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

To be included in the Final Report.

2.0 ANALYSIS

To be included in the Final Report.

3.0 CONCLUSION

3.1 Findings

3.1.1 Pilot

- i) The pilot was qualified and approved to perform the flight in accordance with existing regulations.
- ii) The pilot was medically fit and adequately rested to operate the flight.
- iii) A go-around was not initiated when the aircraft deviated from the

runway centreline, which limited the opportunity to re-establish a stabilised approach and attempt another landing.

3.1.2 Aircraft

- i) The aircraft was airworthy when cleared for the flight.
- ii) The aircraft has a valid Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) and has been maintained in compliance with regulations.

3.1.3 Aircraft Operator

The aircraft operator has taken proactive measures by reaching out to the MRO for assistance in providing further repair recommendations, and the crew has discussed preventive actions internally to mitigate such incidents in the future.

3.1.4 Aerodrome Operator

- i) Excessive vegetation growth, including tall grass and small trees near the runway edges, was observed within the aerodrome area. This condition could obstruct visibility, create hazards to aircraft operations, and compromise safe operating conditions.
- ii) The lack of a serviceable windsock at Pangkor Island Airport represented a safety deficiency, as it prevented pilots from obtaining a direct visual indication of wind direction and strength during approach and landing.

3.2 Probable Cause

To be included in the Final Report.

4.0 IMMEDIATE SAFETY ACTIONS

4.1 Pilot

4.1.1 Encouraging Reporting: Pilots should be encouraged to report any abnormalities or concerns regarding aircraft systems. This proactive communication enables timely troubleshooting and intervention by maintenance teams, ensuring that issues are addressed promptly and minimizing risks to aircraft airworthiness.

4.1.2 Maintaining Situational Awareness: Pilots must maintain a high level of situational awareness during all flight phases, particularly concerning aircraft systems and performance. Vigilance in monitoring cockpit instrumentation and responding

promptly to anomalies is crucial for safe and efficient flight operations.

4.2 Aircraft Operator

4.2.1 Fostering a Culture of Improvement: The organisation should foster a culture

of continual improvement by encouraging pilots and maintenance personnel to actively

participate in identifying areas for enhancement related to aircraft systems and

operational procedures.

4.3 Aerodrome Operator

4.3.1 Safe Obstacle-Free Zones.: Establish a regular vegetation control programme,

to clear grass and remove small trees within the aerodrome area, particularly near the

runway edges, in order to ensure safe operating conditions.

4.3.2 Windsock: The Aerodrome Operator of Pangkor Island Airport shall ensure the

installation and proper maintenance of a serviceable windsock in accordance with

ICAO Annex 14 and CAD 14.

4.4 Other safety recommendations will be included in the Final Report.

Investigator-in-charge

ΔAIR

Ministry of Transport Malaysia

13

Appendix A



Aircraft Certificate of Airworthiness



Aircraft Certificate of Registry