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Date : 19 April 2018
Type : Boeing B737-900
Registration : 9M-LNJ
Operator : Malindo Airways Sdn. Bhd.
Fatality : 0
Nature : Runway Excursion
Location : Tribhuvan International Airport, Kathmandu, Nepal

SUMMARY

On 19th April 2018, flight OD181 operated by Malindo Airways departing KTM bound for KUL using RWY20. Wind was calm but it was drizzling. According to the pilot, during takeoff roll at approximately V1 speed, 'Take-Off Configuration' aural warning came on. Captain decided to 'Reject the Take-off' taking consideration of high terrain and bad weather all around KTM. However the aircraft was not able to stop on the runway and skidded off at the end of runway around 50m after the threshold of RWY02. After liaising with KTM tower, ground crew, fire rescue services, and the authority, the crew was instructed to open door 2R in armed mode and disembark the passengers using the slide. No injuries to all crew and passengers. After the maintenance inspection, there was no damage found on the aircraft structures, flight controls, engines and landing gears. However, number 2 main wheel found deflated. All wheels were replaced by maintenance personnel as per AMM requirement.

PROBABLE CAUSE

The probable cause of the runway excursion was due to the PIC attempted to reject the take-off at high speed, following take-off Configuration Warning. The rejected TO was initiated at the speed of 154kts, which is above V1. In addition, the maximum braking was not applied throughout the stopping.

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the operator:

1. To ensure the B737 SOP STANDARD TAKE-OFF BRIEFING to be aligned with Boeing QRH RTO criteria, and specify what items may trigger a RTO below 80kts, and above 80kts.
2. To ensure the FON to be issued to communicate the new take-off briefing and to enforce its review during all pre-flight briefings, to enforce the recommendations stated in the Boeing Technical Bulletin 737-04-1 R1 and to enforce the importance of Captain's briefing to the Cabin Crew prior the flight.
3. To ensure the RTO criteria detailed in Boeing QRH to be structured in the Simulator briefing and Line Training. Communicate the need of emphasizing this criteria to all instructors.



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4. To check with Boeing the recommended/best practice on the use of the Autobrake during the RTO. Review the MXD RTO procedure accordingly, and emphasise the use of the simulator sessions to assess pilots' compliance with it.
5. To ensure the OM-A (Ref 11.1.3) to specify the responsibility of Flight Crew - to include the preservation of the CVR/DFDR after an incident/accident. To consider the in case of a pilot incapacitation and to define a proper back up that can ensure CVR/FDR preservation.
6. To check with Boeing Tech. Rep. whether there is a new revision of the Bulletin and to check whether there is further actions to be taken in case the recommendations are followed but not enough to prevent the false TO Configuration Warning to be triggered.
7. To issue FON to enforce the recommendations stated in the Boeing Technical Bulletin 737-04-1 R1.
8. The operator is to issue FON to enforce the importance of Captain's briefing to the Cabin Crew prior to the flight.