



SI 08/17



Date : 24 September 2017
Type : Super King Air B200GT
Registration : 9M-WSK
Operator : Hornbill Skyways Sdn. Bhd.
Fatality : 0
Nature : Runway Excursion
Location : Kuching International, Sarawak

SUMMARY

On 24 September 2017, at 1605 LT, a Hornbill Skyways Sdn. Bhd. (HSSB) Super King Air, B200GT registration 9M-WSK was performing a non-scheduled communication flight from Mukah Airfield (WBGK) to Kuching International Airport (WGGG), Sarawak with 4 passengers and 3 crew on board. Upon landing on runway 25 at Kuching International Airport, the aircraft experienced runway excursion to the right of the runway pavement. The weather was cloudy and heavy downpour with cross-wind from the left during the final phase of the landing and also during landing roll.

The aircraft travelled approximately 600 meters on the soft ground parallel to the runway before coming to a stop parallel to the runway heading of 255 degrees. The nose gear collapsed just before the aircraft came to a complete halt position.

All the passengers and crew were safely evacuated from the aircraft using the Airstair Entrance Door. No injuries were reported however the aircraft sustained damages to the nose gear assembly and also the lower fuselage aft of the nose gear as a result of the runway excursion. The runway was closed for approximately 6 hours to allow recovery of the aircraft from the occurrence site to the Hornbill hangar.

Two (2) investigators from the AAIB were sent to Kuching on 25 September 2017 and investigation begun at the accident site on the same day.

PROBABLE CAUSE

1. Sudden Increase in the intensity of rain while flaring to land resulted in the significant reduction of the PF visual reference. Without the visual contact with runway centerline, the PF was not able to detect the lateral movement or heading change of the aircraft, therefore, the PF was unable to correct the displacement away from the runway centerline. The drift was also compounded by the sudden increase of strong crosswind from the left.

2. The PF had likely lost his positional and directional awareness with reference to the runway due to the degraded visibility, hence, he did not exert sufficient and timely rudder application to regain the runway centerline before departing the paved portion of the runway.



SAFETY MESSAGE

1. HSSB to coach the flight crews that were involved in using their best judgment, knowledge and experience in relation to identifying and managing potential risks relating to takeoff, approach and landing in heavy rain, strong winds and thunderstorm. HSSB is to develop a syllabus for remedial training and assessment with emphasis on crosswind takeoff and landings, including go-around and wave-off practices both in manual and autopilot mode as applicable.
2. HSSB to emphasized CRM knowledge to ensure that all flight crews conduct thorough evaluation of the potential risks and hazards that are associated with the flight. Having identified the applicable risks, flight crews should discuss their expectations and develop a shared mental model of the situation at hand, including any required mitigation to properly and proactively address the threats identified. In this respect, HSSB is to ensure that the flight crews that were involved are subjected to remedial training in CRM, with specific emphasis on the effective employment of Threat Error Management principals during pre-departure and arrival briefings. Elements relating to situational awareness, critical thinking, decision making and communication should be included in the training program. The communication module should highlight the need to be assertive and to voice out clearly of any developing or impending safety deficiencies that require immediate action by the PF.
3. HSSB, Flight Operations to identify and provide information to flight crews with regards to local weather phenomenon and other potential risks that are specific to selected airports through OM (C) or other suitable means. Having an enhanced knowledge of the local weather phenomenon would be beneficial in ensuring safe aircraft operations in the dynamic and often challenging meteorological conditions.
4. HSSB, Flight crew training program should be expanded to include goaround manoeuvres below DA/MDA or close to the runway that are potentially caused by:
 - a) Loss of sufficient visual reference.
 - b) Aircraft is no longer assured of landing within the confines of the runway.
 - c) Runway becomes unusable due to presence of obstacles or other foreign objects. d) Loss of required runway lightings.
 - e) Unstable approaches.
 - f) Any other reasons that are deemed necessary.
5. ATC Kuching shall review the procedure in providing latest visibility information to the pilots, the information that were provided were not consistent with the weather changes. Hence, the pilots were not fully aware of the rapidly changing weather condition in the area over the runway.
6. DCA Malaysia to consider installation of runway centerline lights at airports without centerline light that are frequently exposed to risk of adverse weather condition. The necessity can be identified by having risk assessment evaluation.